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10 September 1984

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ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN 1985-1989 PLAN REVIEWED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 1059, 8-14 Jun 84 pp 11-13

[Article by "S.C.": The Land's Share; Source: ONS REVUE No 2, 1984]

[Text] The trend in agriculture over the 1967-1978 and 1979-1983 shows that despite the efforts put into expanding it, the farm sector is still facing tough problems and, in some aspects, the problems have been aggravated. Production is sluggish, and is increasingly inadequate to satisfy national needs, thus deepening our increasing dependency on increasingly costly imports. The various measures the government has taken -- restructuring land ownership and the socialist sector, and more complete integration of the private sector into the agricultural recovery program adopted over recent years -- should open the way for a better strategic approach to agricultural development so as to bring agriculture more fully into the process of national development. Agriculture will no longer be the poor relation in national planning.

Bread as blackmail is a real threat to our economic independence and to our political sovereignty. This is the backdrop against which agriculture was assigned priority in the forthcoming plan for 1985-1989 at the close of the 12th session of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front (FLN). Reducing our food dependency is the nation's prime concern. However, the period just ended has demonstrated the inadequacy of the farm production base to satisfy the needs of our citizens. From 1962 to 1966, agricultural production conditions were steadily deteriorating. Was that part of the colonial heritage? Maybe. The 1967-1978 was, on the contrary, marked by a number of radical measures (application of new laws on worker-management, of the Agrarian Revolution, the adoption of adequate environmental structures, implementation of agricultural development plans). These were

all measures specifically designed to transform the rural world and to make it part of the great undertaking of our country's economic and social development.

From 1979 to 1983, several sessions of the Central Committee of the FLN Party were devoted to agriculture. The goal was to breathe new life into this sector, so as to restore it to its rightful place in the national economy. Major efforts on behalf of the farm sector embodied in the 1967-68 and 1979-83 plans were not sufficient, in most cases, to reach the objectives set. There are still problems in the areas of organization, management, and maintenance and we simply must solve them if we are to break out of our costly food dependency.

Arable Land and Its Preservation

Of the 7.5 million hectares which comprise our arable land (SAU), only 4.6 million are actually under cultivation. The rest lies fallow, even though returning them to production has been promised in every national plan. The SAU in fact comprises only 3 percent of the country's total land mass. Furthermore, irrigated farmlands cover only 270,000 hectares, or 3.5 percent of SAU. Add to this the losses of farmland to other sectors, notably buildings and public works (BTP). The Agriculture Ministry says that 250,000 hectares of farmland has been turned into industrial zones (500 hectares at Skikda, 500 hectares at Ain Smara Constantine (formerly SONACOME), 200 hectares to CNIC Shelghoum Laid...). Hence the need to put a stop to this plundering of farmlands.

If we want to look at what other countries are doing, we find that the SAU in 1982 was 0.55 for Spain, 0.42 for Greece, and 0.50 for France. However, the conservation of the SAU, its excellent management, increases in its production potential by bringing fallow lands back into bearing, and expansion of irrigation (there are 960,000 hectares of irrigable lands right now) are all goals that absolutely must be met if we are to increase our farm production capability. One of the priorities in agriculture is the winning of new farmlands through development of agriculture in the Sahara and on the High Plateaux, and restoring vegetation to the steppes. And finally we must at long last move to develop lands that are "asleep." Hence the need to upgrade existing water systems and to build more of them, until we have mobilized all our water potential.

Winning new lands for farming also means solving the salinity problem (keeping salts well below the surface). The "Habra" (salting) phenomenon in the Mohammadia region is significant. The salinity of this unirrigated land has devastated entire farm holdings, entailing the loss of a great many fertile fields.

The Farm Labor Force: Wooing Back the Young

If all this land is to be brought into production, there will have to be an abundance of farm workers. This kind of worker has become increasingly hard to come by these days.

What is happening is that country youngsters scorn farm work as hard and dirty, and are moving toward the cities in search of an easier job and what is known as a better life-setting. As they do this, they are swelling the working-age populations in the cities. The rural exodus from 1967 to 1978 has been estimated at 1.3 million people. In 1967, the working farm population was estimated at close to 1.5 million people, or 60 percent of the total working population. In 1982, that share is only 40 percent. And the concomitant of this is an aging and very low-skilled working farm population. The problem of bringing young workers back to the farm arises again when we know that more than 75 percent of the full-time work force in the socialist farm sector is over 50. The goal is to stabilize country populations, meaning that we must set up small and medium industrial plants, provide housing, transportation, public health and sanitation facilities, elementary and middle schools, academies, vocational training centers, recreation facilities... Elsewhere in the world a lot of young people are happily and enthusiastically opting for the good life down on the -- mechanized -- farm.

NATIONAL FOOD REQUIREMENTS MET BY IMPORTS

	1967-69	1970-73	1974-77	1979-82
Cereal grains	28%	29%	50%	65%
Dried legumes	12%	08.%	40%	85%
Eggs	04%	35%	47%	75%

Seed Grain and Farm Equipment

Yet another problem: supplying the farms with seed grain and farm equipment. The figures show that fertilizer consumption has increased markedly, up from 100,000 tons per year from 1967 to 1970 to close to 500,000 tons per year during the 1979-82 period. This meant that farmers in 1967 were applying 15 kilos of fertilizer per hectare, but using close to 75 kilos per hectare in 1982. All that work, however, yielded no appreciable improvement in farm yields. Worth noting is the fact that the socialist sector, which farms 40 percent of the SAU, including some of our most fertile lands, used nearly 75 percent of all the fertilizer, while the private sector, farming 60 percent of the SAU, used only 25 percent.

In 1967, we had 11,000 tractors and 2,700 combines and in 1982 those numbers had risen to 52,000 tractors and 5,225 combines. If you divide the number of hectares by the number of tractors, that works out in 1967 to 1 tractor per 500 hectares, and in 1982 to 1 tractor for every 123 hectares. Note that the private sector, which utilized its farm machinery more efficiently, got 15,000 tractors in 1979-1983, in addition to the 7,000 it already had in 1967-1978.

This increase in farm machinery did not bring about a proportional increase in production. In the socialist sector, the machinery was not fully utilized. The lack of maintenance accounts for the high rate of breakdowns which could have been repaired but were left on the scrap heap for highly mysterious reasons.... There, more or less, you have the causes for underutilization of these machines.


A Whole Lot of Money....

All these lands, these human resources, these seed-grains and these machines put together cost money and generate performance estimates in dinars. At current prices, the value-added factor for agriculture, which was close to 2 billion dinar in 1967, rose to 12.2 billion in 1982, for an annual mean growth rate of about 5 percent from 1967 to 1976, and close to 12 percent from 1979 to 1982, while agriculture's share of GNP slipped from 12.9 percent in 1967 to 9 percent in 1973, 7.7 percent in 1978, and around 7 percent in 1982. That would indicate that agriculture's contribution to formation of national revenues is steadily shrinking and in fact soaks up some oil revenues. The socialist sector's share in agriculture's contribution to GNP comes close to 20 percent for 1982 and that is pretty stable, since its share was only 19 percent for the 1967-78 period. Note, though, that this sector became sole heir to a land-grant of nearly 1.1 million hectares as a result of the Agrarian Revolution, but, because of the price system imposed upon it, it has not, in the event, proved very productive. The stability of this rate is attributable in large part to the higher market value of private-sector production over the 1979-1983 period, thanks to measures taken in the areas of marketing and of prices for supplies of fertilizer and farm machinery.

Farm incomes comprise only a relatively minor share of the national income. In current prices, it has declined from 24.3 percent in 1967 to around 6.8 percent in 1982 (1.9 billion dinar in 1967, 4.9 billion in 1977, and 11 billion in 1982). The weakness seen in agriculture's contribution to GNP is aggravated by the growth of the rural population and hence rising demand for satisfaction of rural citizens' needs. Hence the resort to imports, which further accentuates our food dependency. In 1982, imports of food products accounted for nearly 20 percent of total imports. According to a consumer survey conducted by the National Statistics Office (ONS) in 1979-1980, almost two of every three calories we

consume is imported. You can trace the growth of this dependency in the figures shown above for certain strategic products.

ARABLE FARMLAND EXPRESSED IN HECTARES
PER CAPITA IS SHRINKING YEAR BY YEAR



It needs pointing out, though, that our country is all but totally dependent when it comes to equipment and feed for livestock. Measures taken in recent years to improve social services for farm workers, The massive investments poured into the agriculture sector have reached the saturation point. It is not an investment problem that faces our farmers, but problems of organization, of management, of failure to recognize all our potentials, of proper use of our farmlands pegged to their level of rainfall...

Once we have an intensive, high-performance agriculture, we can be sure of self-sufficiency in food first of all, and, just as surely, of an exportable farm surplus thereafter.

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ROLE OF TECHNICAL TRAINING IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Nos 217-218, Feb-Mar 84 pp 62-73

[Article by Jacques Dufeu, former teacher at the Technical Education Institute of Bouzateate (Algiers): "Industry and Technical Training in Algeria"]

[Text] After a long period of colonial domination during which the economy was geared to meet the needs of the colonizing country, Algeria engaged in an industrial development process that was to change drastically its socio-economic structures.

Independent Algeria had to meet legitimate social aspirations with respect to urban employment, schooling and vocational training, which somewhat conflicted with the strategic choices required by its development. The application of modern technology for large industrial projects, the weakness or lack of job-generating consumer-goods industries hindered the integration of the underskilled and undertrained local labor force which, as a result, was oriented to the tertiary sector, thus causing a proliferation of "non-productive jobs."

Until recently, it seemed logical to make up for the lack of highly skilled local labor by using oil revenues to bring foreign workers under contract into the production process, but things have changed now that large numbers of young people--some with an education but many without any job skills--are entering the labor market and will not be excluded from the vast construction site that Algeria has become.

The exacerbation of social demand in the field of employment,¹ added to the necessary redistribution among the various activity sectors and to the incipient Algerianization of the industry's cadres, technicians and skilled workers, will lead to a precipitate and empirical response that will correspondingly reveal the lack of any true medium and long-term training policy.

In addition to observing the existing discrepancy between the needs for skilled workers and our training potential, it is interesting to classify the difficulties and obstacles which contribute to the development of a reformist schooling and training policy whose impact on the industrial development project is to be feared.

Since not enough skilled workers are trained to meet the demand of the Algerian economy, it would seem a priori that the development of an empirical approach to correct this quantitative imbalance is justified and should be encouraged.

Thus, a study of the Algerian training system² shows a lack of consistency and unity, which materializes into a scattering of training programs. This results from the lack of an overall training policy, which led to the implementation of punctual solutions to meet the assumed needs of the economy.

The multiplicity of training structures and the lack of contacts between the organizations involved are perpetuating the present compartmentalization. As a result, training programs tend to develop in an autarchic manner. Some national companies train nearly all their personnel, from the maintenance gardener to the design engineer, and have recourse to national training structures only in extreme and urgent cases. Along the same lines, we often observe that some national companies will hire many skilled construction workers--sometimes more than the tasks to be accomplished would warrant--although these companies are operating in economic sectors that have nothing to do with the building trade and although, at the same time, these workers are badly needed by construction companies. Far from relieving "official training structures," this practice merely reinforces the inconsistency of the system and, as a result, the mistakes made in training options.

Therefore, it is easier to understand why the Plan suffered setbacks in its attempt to develop a consistent approach to the demand for training. The Plan draws up a realistic picture of the present situation when it states that "the imbalances observed in the qualification structures of public enterprises show that there is an overabundance of administrative or technical personnel with marginal skills, and large shortages of skilled workers and supervisors"; it goes on to admit that the present strategy is helpless to solve these shortages. According to the general report on the Five-Year Plan, "raw quantitative data indicate that the present discrepancies between the number of applicants for vocational training and the existing and planned institutional capacities will continue during the (Plan) period, which implies that a more dynamic and more consistent policy in this respect will have to be implemented."³

Without minimizing the weight of a past that was marked by inadequate schooling and training structures, we may still assume that the present shortage of skilled workers is due essentially to the underestimation of the human factor in the industrial development process. For a long time, the prevalent attitude was that training could be purchased, like machines and technological knowhow.

The Plan also emphasizes that the human factor was not taken into account in the industrial project. According to the Plan, "technologies were selected and certain projects dimensioned without any accurate evaluation of the operational training potential, and this has increased the gap and the imbalances between the actual demand of economic sectors and the national training capacities."⁴ The choice of heavy industry to achieve Algeria's economic development resulted in a strong demand for workers and cadres with a high

level of technical training. Since the training system was not in a position to meet this demand, foreign technical personnel was hired at a time when many young people were entering the labor market without any job skills.

Therefore, the training system must fulfill a dual mission: to meet the economic demand for a skilled labor force, and to meet the social demand for training.

The concordance of the two responses, which is often presented as the ideal model, remains problematic. Whereas social needs and their future projections are known, the same is not true of economic demand, which remains dependent on production trends and technological progress, the latter affecting production methods. Contrary to consumer-goods industries, heavy industry offers only few unskilled jobs. Therefore, it will not be in a position to absorb the mass of young people without job skills. In this context, many training programs were started without any preliminary study, on the assumption that since shortages affected all sectors it was not necessary to attempt to plan the demand--especially as no means were available to do so. Actually, training programs requiring only small investments, such as those involving jobs in the tertiary sector, were soon started at the expense of industrial training programs.

To cope with this imbalance between training profiles and actual economic needs, some propose that the general, technical and vocational schooling provided by the ministries involved in education should be oriented to meeting social needs, whereas enterprises would provide an answer to economic training needs. Far from optimizing the use of our potentials, such a distribution would confirm the heterogeneousness of our training system and would promote its divorce from the production system.

In addition, individual aspirations, which are to a large extent pervaded by the values on which the distinction between intellectual and manual labor is based, will further increase the imbalance between the orientations of the training system and economic needs. For the young Algerian, the recently conquered access to knowledge must materialize through an orientation toward occupations with a high social status,⁵ even if this conflicts with present development options.

A tentative solution can only be provided by a greater opening of the school to the country's actual economic and social conditions, which does not mean that the school has to merge into the production apparatus. Such a school was already called for by the UNESCO at a December 1962 symposium on technical and vocational schools. "General education--the UNESCO General Assembly recommended--should aim not only at inculcating knowledge, but it should also prepare the student to take an active part in life, by making him familiar with the production and use of goods created by technology and by making him understand the world in which he lives."⁶ There is a startling similarity between this recommendation and the definition of the objectives of the basic and polytechnic school which the Algerian government is trying to implement.

Genesis of the Scientific and Technical Mind

The rapid and sudden industrialization of Algeria brought about profound changes in an essentially rural population that was ill-prepared to reconsider its own scales of values. It will take several generations before the traditional attitudes and thought patterns are forgotten and replaced by a more rigorous and rational approach to the facts.

This does not mean only that the peasant must do a good job in his new role as a factory worker, but also that he must adopt a way of life and an attitude in agreement with the demands of industrial society. This problem, which is found in all developing countries, is particularly acute in Algeria because of the importance of the industrial projects and related technological options.

This difficult mutation is summarized very clearly by J. Fourastie. "Whereas the people in Western countries have had 200 years and 5 to 8 generations to go from the traditional rural mentality in which rites are the predominant characteristic, to the technical mentality in which experimenting is the predominant characteristic, the average Third-World man, and in many cases even the Third-World engineer, must achieve in himself, within a single lifetime, the process that leads from the farmer to the factory worker, the engineer, the manager or the financier... From a global and instinctive life unaware of space and time, man must go over, within a single generation, to analysis, measurement, the computing of inert and disparate factors (...)."

"As a result, man's notion of the world is disrupted: the man who must face the industrial world without an adequate education will be at a loss to identify and handle things because, although he will be fully aware that this world is different from the animal and plant world, he (...) will not realize what machines, mechanical energy, industrial organizations are."⁷

The peasant and his family may become citified, but that does not mean that they will have access to the scientific and technical fields. According to G. Bachelard, this approach to science implies the acceptance of a sudden mutation in contradiction with the past. But the rural population is still very much attached to traditions and does not seem ready for this mutation. At most, it sees the school as a means to gain access to technical knowledge, i.e. to industrial jobs, which acquire a higher status due to the prevailing confusion between the idea of development and the idea of industrialization.

The apprenticeship of rationality, as a preliminary to the emergence of the scientific and technical mind, will be approached differently depending on whether or not the child has had a chance to be in contact with technical objects of any kind. Playing with educational toys or games or, more simply, being surrounded by technical objects will give the child a chance to open his mind to scientific and technical civilization. In his study of the colonial heritage and access to technological civilization, A. Memmi emphasized the fact that "usage and enjoyment of technology create technical traditions. The French or the Italian child have a chance to fiddle with an engine, with a radio; they are surrounded by the products of technology. Colonized people often never get near any machine until after they have left their fathers' homes. How could they develop a taste for mechanical civilization and an intuitive knowledge of machines."⁸

Lacking such an environment, the Algerian schoolchild will continue and favor reasoning by analogy, and the appearance of the inductive method will be delayed correspondingly. There are many reasons for this delay, but they all have a common denominator: the child's social and cultural environment. Thus, the didactic principles and methods of the Koranic school, which rely on systematic and prepared answers to questions not formulated by the children, will perpetuate among the latter animistic explanations of phenomena.

In an environment where technical and industrial objects are few, those who come into contact, handle or cope with the operation of such objects will be the exception, thus hindering the maturation of causality [as published] toward a better approach of the scientific field and abstraction. The development of the causal relationship, which varies with individuals, will also suffer from the inadequate development of the experimental practice. After pointing out that the intellectual tools required for experimenting are acquired between age 11 and age 14-15, Jean Piaget stressed the low level of development of experimental practices in cognitive acquisition. While this remark was aimed at "the traditional school systems of certain large countries," it takes a special meaning in the case of non developed countries where many objective causes concur to the under-utilization of experimental practices (lack of consistent structures, of teaching personnel, etc.). "As for experimental practice--Piaget observed--it was looked upon as a minor activity good enough for civilizations with an empiricist philosophy (...). Moreover, it was felt that students were getting adequate experimental practice when they were informed of the results of past experiments or shown demonstration experiments made by the teacher, as if you could learn to swim by looking at bathers while sitting on a bench on the quay."⁹ This experimental mind, a basic component of the scientific and technical mind, must find in the schools an environment conducive to the genesis of a formal logic that will make it easy to function in a technico-industrial environment.

Based on examples of spontaneous behavior and rational experimentation, Jean Piaget concluded that "since, by going from the concrete operations stage to the stage of propositional, or hypothetical and deductive operations, the child becomes capable both of combining hypotheses and checking them experimentally (...), it goes without saying that the school must develop and channel these abilities to arrive at an education of the experimental mind and a teaching of the physical sciences focussing on research and discovery rather than on repetition."¹⁰

In an environment that is not very much receptive to the technical message, the Algerian school will contribute to the perpetuation of a traditional education focussing on the safeguard of Arab-Islamic value rather than designed to promote the emergence of the scientific and technical mind, and it will do so in spite of the many official speeches stressing the need for a scientific-minded school. This lack of scientific rigor can also be found in the written productions of Algerian students. Compositions or answer to questions are mere juxtapositions of unrelated facts or opinions reflecting stereotypes that have nothing to do with any scientific progression and demonstration. The teachers, who are often issued from the working classes, show their distrust of, or even their hostility to a system in which they

could not succeed. Because most of them are the product of school failures, and because they are inadequately trained, they will often find themselves hard put to provide the clear and firm explanations required by an adolescent population which is beginning to form abstract concepts.

Still according to Piaget, the rapid development of technological civilization will require planners to take into account the formation of the technical and scientific mind in the cognitive process. "To determine how many years of study are required for such a formation--the psychologist underlined--will obviously make sense only if we have detailed information on the effective assimilation of the knowledge involved and especially on the development of the aptitudes for research and practical or experimental adaptation, even as an intervention."¹¹ Referring to the recommendations of the International Conference on Public Education concerning "measures intended to promote the recruiting and training of technical and scientific cadres" (1959), Piaget stressed the importance of "constant cooperation between teachers and scientists in developing teaching structures," and went on to indicate that "the desire for such a cooperation to manifest itself (...) in the fields of technical training and the education of the experimental mind can lead to rather revolutionary consequences (...) if the attempted planning manages to impose such an approach--and it will be taken all the more seriously as educators will be supported by the authority of research and technical people; they will have achieved the most decisive revolution that today's school can expect."¹²

This means that, apart from structural reforms, the school must open itself to the scientific and technical world so as to go beyond the simple acquisition of scientific theories that would merely intensify the duality between "the traditional culture" and the "scientific and technical culture." In his study on the social function of technical education, Claude Grignon denounced the deceptive pleas of those who want to give credit to the idea that some "imitation culture" is necessary for those who cannot or should not have access to "scientific culture."

Timidity of the Reforms Made in the Algerian School System With Respect to the Polytechnic Contribution

The status of technical training in the minds of the Algerian people will rise only with the emergence of the scientific and technical mind; as a prerequisite, the orientations followed until now--which make technical training the last recourse after a failure in the "noble courses of studies"--will have to be corrected. In this context, the availability of polytechnic education cannot be viewed merely as one option in the basic education provided by the school system. Initially, the promoters of polytechnic education saw it as the effective means to adapt the school system to the political and economic options of a country that was building its independence.

The pussyfooting which characterized its implementation was due to a different sensitivity in the approach to the very notion of polytechnic education. Paradoxically, when the adjective "polytechnic" was dropped from the project of a nine-year basic school, which was done at the time of the Lacheraf ministry, it was because of a reluctance to see polytechnic education reduced to a few

hours of technology in a curriculum which would otherwise remain the same. The present situation of the basic school, which recently became "polytechnic" again, confirms the validity of this position. If the addition of five hours of physical sciences and technology to the third cycle of the basic school can be viewed positively, it is in itself inadequate to warrant the use of a polytechnic label, for it is merely the addition of another option.

Thus, far from promoting the development of the scientific and technical mind, this Malthusian interpretation of polytechnic education is more likely to be used as a pedagogical excuse to separate those who succeed in school and those who have trouble with the so-called essential subjects. In the latter, it will be easy to detect "certain special job aptitudes" that will warrant their orientation toward technical schools; the basic school will thus reproduce in the school system the association between failure and orientation toward technical schools which it was supposed to fight.¹³ After indicating that the basic school would become polytechnic only after the completion of the second cycle (the former elementary cycle), the minister of education and basic schooling confirmed that the optional character and short-term realism of this education prevailed over a pedagogical strategy on a larger scale. According to Mr Kharroubi, "in the basic school, there is a systematic vocational guidance due to the fact that vocations are detected in time, as a function of the country's needs for mid-level technical cadres which are cruelly lacking."¹⁴

One major obstacle to the successful implementation of the polytechnic school remains the teachers' low recruiting and training level. The teacher will contribute to reproduce values of which he himself is a product, favoring language at the expense of scientific rigor. He will have to master mathematics and scientific and technical fields and at the same time make systematic use of experimenting in order to make the child familiar with the technical object and, through induction, enable him to reach the conceptualization stage. The constant care of education will be to achieve the connection between the technical object and the child's social and economic environment in order to bring about an associative reflex in the latter.

All this requires a complete recasting of teachers' training. The archaic structures of a purely academic education will have to make room for a broader conception and a more rational approach of the relation to knowledge. If retraining can offer a definite interest in the case of teachers whose basic level enable them to follow the progress of scientific research, this is by no means the case of those whose contacts with modern technology are only occasional. Therefore, a special effort must be made to train future schoolteachers, for their task in the basic school goes well beyond the functions that were theirs until now. But at present their training is both too short and qualitatively inadequate. The only novelty resides in the training of technology and physical sciences teachers for the third cycle of the basic school (formerly first cycle of the secondary school). This confirms that the implementation of polytechnic education is actually nothing more than the implementation of a technological initiation in a system which has not changed much otherwise.

The timidity of the reforms made to give a real technical and scientific dimension to the school system is also evidenced by the lack of innovative research adapted to the conditions prevailing in Algeria. Although it is logical to attempt to profit by foreign experiments, especially those made in countries with similar socioeconomic objectives or countries with a similar development strategy, this may in some cases discourage any local initiative and may give to the country orientations that do not always prove very effective. In addition, the magic of words and excessive attachment to slogans can be dangerous when they preclude any reflection whatsoever. In the technical field, the lack of pedagogical research is probably felt more strongly than in other sectors, and therefore use is often made of a terminology borrowed from other experiments. In certain cases, only the designation is imported, not the content; I am thinking in particular of the use made of terms like "technicum" and "polytechnic education," which are borrowed from Soviet and German experiments. In other cases, the content of the experiment is associated to the designation; this is the case of the BTS [higher technician diplomas] sections of technical high schools or Technology Institutes, which are not without recalling the experiments of the French IUT [University Technology Institutes] and BTS sections.

The fact that the colonial period is not far can account for the continued use of a terminology identical to that of the colonizing country, but it should under no circumstances serve as an excuse to maintain the status quo or merely to copy certain experiments that were not too well received in France.

However, the existence of experiments adapted to conditions prevailing in Algeria, like the technology institutes in their initial version, remains dependent on the country's economic orientations. The most significant example of this is provided by the abolition of the technical high schools, for which pedagogic and economic reasons were quickly found at the time. The pedagogic reason was the determination to see educational institutions provide a broad and basic education, and therefore to reject shorter cycles which were said to be unscholastic. The economic reason was the lack of job openings for these skill levels, at a time when the job market was experiencing a strong shortage of technicians and... skilled laborers.

On the other hand, some experiments made in developing countries, and which are interesting, are clearly overlooked. We are thinking, among other experiments, of the radical methods used for the Cuban literacy campaign, which contrast with Algeria's timid commitments in this respect. The same is true of initiatives associating "productive" work and school work. This association is a key factor in the struggle against the division between intellectual and manual work.

Except for a few attempts¹⁵ which were the result of personal initiatives rather than any political determination, there are extremely few examples of association between productive labor and the school system. The important part played by productive labor in the educational process has not been well perceived. On the contrary, it looks as if everything was done to hinder the emergence of the producer's consciousness. Thus, the "in-factory training periods" which are part of teaching at certain institutions are often nothing

more than a visit to a factory, or even training in the art of chronic absenteeism.

In addition to the sociopolitical impact of productive labor on the genesis of a socialist ethic in the future producer, psychopedagogical considerations should not be overlooked.¹⁶ Many countries, representing all types of development policy, have realized the importance of the school-production relationship. In the past few years, Soviet universities have recognized that education and applied research should not be dissociated. Experimental research and the dissemination and implementation of discoveries are encouraged. According to V. Afanassiev, "the scientific work produced by students is progressively acquiring a massive character. Three hundred students' research organizations are now operating in the Soviet Union. In 1970, the students could boast of 600 interventions, 300 patents and close to 4,000 inventions applied to production."¹⁷

What surprises most those who study the Algerian school system is the lack of any real audacity in designing and implementing a polytechnic education to meet the country's development ambitions. The limitations are those imposed by the political project of the ruling small bourgeoisie, a project that is imprecise and subject to variations resulting from struggles among the various classes of society. The small bourgeoisie, which is effectively supported by the state technocracy, believes it can increase the value of its State stock by purchasing technology and training. This technocratic illusion gives an accurate idea of the context in which the training system will have to operate.

Short-term views, hesitations, the reproduction of foreign options prevail over the country's own reflection and progress which, while drawing lessons from past experiments, could be resolutely open to concepts that would be revolutionary rather than reformist.

FOOTNOTES

1. The annual growth rate of the population, estimated at 3.5 percent, is one of the highest in the world. The measures recently adopted by the government to make families aware of this problem and encourage them to consider "family planning," seem to be both too little and too late.
2. See my third-cycle thesis: "Enseignement technique et formation professionnelle en Algerie" [Technical Education and Vocational Training in Algeria], Paris-V, June 1982.
3. General Report on the 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan, MPAT [Ministry of Planning and National Development], 1980, p 153.
4. *Idem*, p 117.
5. Depending on the educational level, these range from physicians or lawyers, who have real social status, to office workers whose status is but an illusion.

6. Excerpt from the recommendation on technical and vocational education adopted by the 12th session of the UNESCO General Conference in Paris on 11 December 1962; in "La formation des professeurs d'enseignement technique et professionnel" [The training of technical and vocational schoolteachers], UNESCO Press, Paris, 1971 p 12.
7. Fourastie, J., foreword to Taeb Said-Amer's book, "L'Industrialisation en Algerie," published by Anthropos, Paris, 1978, p 9.
8. Memmi, A., "Portrait d'un colonisé" [Portrait of a colonized man], Payot, 1963, p 145.
9. Piaget, J., "Psychologie et pedagogie," published by Denoel-Gonthier, Paris, 1969, p 78.
10. Piaget, J., "Psychologie et pedagogie," op. cit. p 80.
11. Piaget, J., "Psychologie et pedagogie," op. cit. p 135.
12. Piaget, J., "Psychologie et pedagogie," op. cit. p 137.
13. We can make a parallel with the technology classes given in French CES [secondary schools]. The ability to disassemble a lock or represent a technical object in three views provide pedagogical support to the orientation of students toward vocational secondary schools.
14. Interview with Mr Kharroubi published in REVOLUTION AFRICAINE No 900 dated 22 May 1981. This interview should be compared with the interview which the minister of education had given eight months before to the same weekly: "The advantage of polytechnic education--he was to state--is that it creates a tie between the intellectual worker and the manual worker. The second advantage is that the child's innate gifts and aptitudes are discovered in time. That will enable us to provide a better orientation of these students." (in REVOLUTION AFRICAINE dated 12 September 1980).
15. "We heard recently about a large industrial complex in the west of the country, where some machines were not working due to the failure of some parts (...). A teacher at the Oran technical high-school heard about it and asked to examine the defective parts; his conclusion was that they could be made at his school. This was done at extremely low cost." (REVOLUTION AFRICAINE dated 20 February 1981).
16. When the parts manufactured by students of technical schools end up in the waste basket, this cannot be considered as a factor of motivation.
17. Afanassiev, V., "Production, gestion, formation permanente" [Production, Management, Continued Education], Progress Press, Moscow, 1976, p 483.

9294
CSO: 4519/237

DOMESTIC POLITICAL FORCES ASSESSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 386, 14 Jul 84 p 29

[Article by Mohamed el-Ashab: "Moroccan Equilibrium in Wind of Political Struggle"]

[Text] Two months before voting day for parliamentary elections, King Hasan II announced last Sunday that a series of measures were being taken to ensure that these elections would be carried out in a suitable atmosphere. They concern the release of six ministers of state who are leaders of the big political parties from their traditional functions. They also have to do with controlling the debate over questions of education, through commitment of the state to resolutions strengthening vocational education and supporting school entry in a normal environment, in addition to guiding the course of the electoral campaigns which the political parties will conduct when the electoral battle officially begins.

Some of these measures do not surprise anyone, in view of the fact that questions of education in Morocco have become the main concern of the man on the street. There are attempts to guide this sector toward productivity and mastery of the difficulties which usually arise at the end of every academic year. At the same time, it is noted that the release of the heads of political parties from their functions in the context of the current transition government raises many questions:

First, the position of all of these parties, or some of them, on the formula for participation in the legislative elections, since they must launch electoral campaigns in which they are committed to clearly-defined programs. Some political organizations have found that these programs are not compatible with their remaining in the government apparatus.

Second, what the political map will be in the next 6 years, since every political organization is trying to move to gain votes, in order to obtain the greatest number of seats. It is clear that there is a trend toward making this map different than it was in the previous parliamentary experiment. Whether it is a question of a step toward an open-door policy or creation of some kind of equilibrium, it is noteworthy that the release of the six ministers of state from their posts is a confirmation of the existence of a governmental crisis of a particular nature, represented by a clash in positions of the participating parties over a number of problems.

The Socialist Union of Popular Forces, known as the most powerful opposition party, tests out its participation in the current transition government by insisting on criticizing many government measures. Abderrahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Union, has stated on more than one occasion that he represents the voice of the opposition in the government and that the participation of his party in the government apparatus has a definite mission. The Istiqlal Party in turn entered the fight by confronting the administration on the basis of the fact that its participation in the coming elections would be defined in light of the protection, honesty and neutrality of the administration. In the last 2 months the party has been subjected to the removal of two of its seats in the present government. The party had been supervising their actions. Meanwhile it seems that its problem with the Ministry of Education, which is run by a leading member of the party, is in the forefront of its great difficulties. The positions of the other parties are divided along all party lines. Some of them think that they are not represented in the government to the extent which their size demands. Others consider that the coming elections in themselves will define their choices. However, the most important point in this situation which appears as a justification in the political considerations of every organization is that the exit of the ministers of state from the current government seems to be a preface to provoking the dispute. Perhaps the sole winner in this operation is the Socialist Union of Popular Forces which will face a party congress this week. Its first secretary, Abderrahim Bouabid, has been relieved of his government functions, since he found no objection to criticizing current government choices. However, this coming gain will not save it from criticism, because Minister of Cooperation Abdelouahed Radi, the leading member of the party, remains in his government post.

In fact, the position of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces on more than one question since last year has had a strong impact on the choices of the state. At the outset of its participation in the government, it was said that this step, in other words, the opposition assuming responsibility inside the executive apparatus, was the beginning of the take-off of a new experiment which Morocco had not witnessed for approximately one-quarter of a century. Today one can say that the returns from its participation are the same ones which will define the broad outlines of the future political map. Years ago, there was furious debate, as electoral seasons drew near, over the question of participation in the elections as such. Will one participate or not? Today the manner of participation is the heart of that debate. Hasan II alluded frankly to this subject when he said in his speech last Sunday that during the period before elections he will never pardon anyone who tries to deceive the Moroccan people, especially those who know the figures. The fact is that if this signal means an invitation to maintain a kind of truce during the electoral campaigns, then it reveals the existence of a greater flaw with regard to the current transition government in its dealing with the issues raised. These issues have to do with education, the economic crisis and the level of government solidarity. The Moroccan monarch has assigned two basic tasks to the transition government, which was formed not even 1 year ago--supervise the parliamentary elections and prepare conditions for holding a

referendum in the Western Sahara. The two tasks were an incentive to the opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces to participate in the executive apparatus, inasmuch as fateful issues were involved. However, today, with the release of the ministers of states from their duties and the problem of the Sahara left in a deadlock because of considerations concerning the development of African events, it seems that many powers have been wrested from the current government.

As 14 September, the date of the elections, draws near, one can say that the campaigns have now begun. However, the picture of the political map is still covered by a high degree of uncertainty. There is an uncertain position with regard to the Socialist Union of Popular Forces until its conference is convened next week. Debate will revolve around the party's committing itself to a clearly defined attitude toward the party and government worker alike. There is an uncertain position with regard to the Istiqlal Party which is still seeking guarantees of honesty and neutrality. There is also an uncertain position with regard to the rest of the parties which are still panting after the consecration of their positions on the banks of the government or the opposition, in the context of respect for the democratic game.

The picture is on this level of political agitation which precedes the outbreak of the fight. It is clear that Morocco, through this experiment, will face fateful choices which might transform the nature of the equilibrium which has existed for the last one-quarter of a century, approximately. Out of the democratic issue they might create a stage of taking a breath. However, it is probable that difficulties of current crises will hasten the first choice, if there is a desire to consecrate a policy of rotation and political, mutual understanding.

7811
CSO: 4505/363

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL EMPHASIZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 386, 14 Jul 84 p 35

[Article: "The Western Sahara--Ordinary Land or Buried Treasure?"]

[Text] Those who have observed development projects in the Western Sahara have noticed that Morocco has spent millions of dollars on this desert located on the Atlantic Ocean. This desert enjoys a relatively moderate climate in comparison to temperatures in the Great Sahara, the Libyan Plateau or the Arabian Desert. It may be more similar in climate to Jordan, but at the same time, it has a basic lack of water and arable land. For this reason, it cannot be considered the land of the future for Morocco, supplying it with food and water, but simply land.

However, this is not the true state of affairs. Reports discuss the fact that the Western Sahara is rich in phosphates and iron ore, in addition to the fact that it is a large grazing land capable of becoming a source of meat. Also, its coast has fish resources which are the envy of the Western world. Consequently, it is a horizon for development with regard to Morocco which suffers from a population explosion. This horizon is limitless if man pursues an appropriate formula for cultivation of the Sahara and water desalinization through solar power. This is the secret of the struggle for the Western Sahara which is considered a natural extension of Morocco from a geographical standpoint. This struggle is nourished by the strategic position of both the Sahara, which overlooks the Atlantic Ocean, and a number of West African nations.

On the basis of these facts, Morocco has directed a great amount of its resources toward developing the Sahara since 1976. Today the capital has taken on the form of a city. It used to be a small village founded by the Spanish in 1937. Today its population has reached 100,000. Moroccan officials say that they have spent \$500 million on developing the Sahara which covers 260,000 square kilometers. However, foreign observers believe that Morocco has spent \$2 billion on developing the Western Sahara where the population is no greater than 150,000. That is an average of \$250 million per year. Work is now underway in the capital to build a big sports stadium and an international airport and port. All signs indicate that Morocco clings tenaciously to the Western Sahara and will not allow its surrender. This prompts one to think that the fight with Algeria and

Mauritania over the Sahara will be a long one. Moroccan companies are involved in exploiting phosphate mines in the Sahara. Reserves amount to more than 1 billion tons. Morocco extracted nearly 1.5 million tons total from these mines last year. That represents 10 percent of the total production of Morocco which is approximately 15 million tons annually.

Moroccan boats fish in the territorial waters of the Sahara, although their operations have not yet developed to the stage of wide-scale exploitation of these waters rich in sardines, tuna and other fish. Spanish fishing boats have carried on this trade from the time Spain occupied the Sahara to the present. In connection with this, it is said that the Spanish learned the value of the Western Sahara only in the early 1970's. Besides fishing and exploiting phosphate, Spain was also interested in drilling for oil, even though there was no evidence indicating the possibility of finding it. Spanish experts went as far as planning to build new settlements and an economic structure which would make it possible with time to explore for new deposits of gold and other scarce metals. However, the withdrawal of Spain from the Sahara in 1976 prevented this.

The main problem facing development of the Sahara is the fact that Morocco itself is suffering from a shortage of water. If not, it would be possible to quench the thirst of the Sahara and increase its population. Also, the search for new ground water is an extremely costly operation. Moroccan officials deny that their country occupied the Sahara in order to exploit its buried treasure. They content themselves with saying only, "it is part of our national territory." Meanwhile, they continue with modest plans to expand the cities of the Sahara and create a flow of internal migration into them, hoping that in the long run, the population of Morocco will expand southward instead of remaining in the countryside and in the cities. Is the Sahara Morocco's hope for the future, or is it just a fight over land?

7811
CSO: 4504/363

ATTACKS ON KHARK ISLAND SEEN TO CONTINUE

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 64, 30 Jun 84 p 17

[Article by Diyab Nabhan: "Iraq Rings Khark With Fire, Considers Security Council Resolution 540 Forgotten"]

[Text] After a period of relative calm, which continued for some days in the attacks against shipping in the Arab Gulf, and after the reports that discussed the lowering of insurance fees against the dangers of war for ships that risk going to the Iranian island of Khark, the Iraqi air strike against four large naval targets south of the island, on 24 June, confirmed once again Baghdad's determination to deprive Tehran of the use of the Gulf to export its oil, so long as the waters of the Gulf are also forbidden to it.

The Iraqi newspaper AL-THAWRAH went to an extreme in this regard, in its editorial of 25 June, when it said in the context of commenting on the new Iraqi air strike: "The deterrent strike is a tangible affirmation and added certainty that the Iraqi blockade of Khark Island will continue and intensify, and that its control will continue. AL-THAWRAH added that "Breaking the blockade of Khark and the rest of the Iranian ports will continue to be an unrealistic dream for Tehran. The sole payment that Iraq would accept for breaking the blockade is an end to the aggression, abandonment of the war mentality and acceptance of the logic of right and an honorable, just and comprehensive peace.

Iraq had previously informed the United Nations that Security Council Resolution 540, which was issued the end of October 1983, was no longer suited to Iraq's demands, in view of the change in circumstances that had prevailed at that time. This was done during the deliberations that preceded Security Council Resolution 552, issued on 1 June, which condemned the Iranian attacks on oil tankers entering and leaving Saudi and Kuwaiti ports.

Moreover, Baghdad has not opposed a suggestion announced by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Council, in which he said that Iran was prepared to stop the attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf, if Iraq declared its agreement as well. This was because of the ambiguity surrounding this proposal on the one hand, because the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Council did not touch on any guarantees that would assure Iraq's right to use its maritime ports to export its oil through the Arab Gulf, and its right to freedom of international navigation.

It has now become clear that Iraq's attacks on Khark Island, which have resulted in a sharp reduction in oil exports, are at the halfway point and probably more. They might develop to a level of launching direct attacks, in order to destroy the island, if Iran carries out new attacks against Iraq's international borders. That would be tantamount to an economic disaster for Iran and would certainly reflect on its war capability, making it face up to the peace option. This is especially true since Tehran has failed to achieve any of the goals that it attempted to reach through attacking the Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers. Iran's undertaking new attacks against tankers would in the opinion of international observers, lead to the loss of several of its serviceable fighter aircraft, especially since Saudi Arabia downed two Iranian Phantoms earlier this month. If we add to that the lack of any strategic usefulness to attacking the Iraqi border, since Iran has suffered huge losses in lives and equipment, and the spectre of war has begun to haunt all the fields of battle in Iran, the Iranian command, which has become a prisoner of its military aspirations, costing it a valuable opportunity for peace, has been unable to continue in its intransigence and rejection of the peace proposals and initiatives broached by many international and regional authorities to end the war. Observers interpret this as nothing more than a maneuver to gain time, to create a climate inside Iran to mobilize more volunteers and send them to the fighting fronts and, on the foreign level, to demand more weapons, so that it can concentrate its efforts on a land attack, especially since the Iranian forces suffer from a chronic shortfall of equipment and spare parts.

Observers attribute this interpretation to Tehran's refusal to accept a team of international observers, and its demand that this team be located in a neighboring country, while Iraq has prepared suitable headquarters in the Iraqi border towns for another team of observers that recently arrived in Baghdad, as well as to the continued attempts by Iran to violate the agreement. Knowledgeable observers think that the policy of self-restraint that Iraq is following regarding Iran's attempts to violate the agreement stem from an Iraqi desire to expose Iran's intentions through the United Nations. However, nothing will make Iraq depart from this policy to a greater extent than that, and it will find itself compelled to reply in kind. However, as a senior Iraqi official told AL-TADAMUN, it would be a response sufficiently violent as to make Tehran lose all its cards, even the expected land attack card, which would not have any usefulness, nor would it result in anything except an increase in the dangerous complications within Iran in light of the dreadful numbers of human casualties, which would oblige it to put an end to it. The expected Iranian attack against South Iraq has been postponed many times during the past few months. Moreover, it is apparent that the Iranians are weaker than at any time in the past, and the numbers of those demanding an end to the war have begun to increase within the ranks of the armed forces and institutions of the regime. That was clearly shown in the flexibility that highlighted the Iranian Government's response to the UN Secretary General's call for an end to the shelling of cities, which was addressed to both Iraq and Iran.

7005
CSO: 4404/561-A

BANK ASSETS RISE IN 1983

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Jun 84 p 3

[Text] The assets of the commercial banks which include the Housing Bank reached 1.863 billion dinars as of the end of 1983 versus 554 million dinars as of the end of 1982. This represents an increase of 19.9 percent.

The deposits of commercial banks of all types (government, public institutions, municipalities, and resident and non-resident private sector) grew by 19.5 percent, reaching 1.398 billion dinars in 1983. This represents 75 percent of all liabilities.

The commercial demand deposits represented 27.8 percent of all these deposits versus 30.3 percent in 1982. Savings deposits represented 10.4 percent versus 16.1 percent, and time deposits and checking represented 56.8 percent versus 51.1 percent in 1982.

This information was published in a report of the Board of Directors of the Association of Banks in Jordan.

In another area, the assets of the authorized loan institutions (with the exception of the Housing Bank) in 1983 totaled 216 million dinars as opposed to 177 million dinars in 1982. This represents an increase of 22 percent.

Loans made by these institutions (excluding the Housing Bank) measured by sums withdrawn totaled approximately 40 million dinars. This brought the total current balance of loans granted by these institutions through the end of the year to approximately 120 million dinars.

In addition, the loans of the Housing Bank increased the total sums withdrawn to approximately 110 million dinars and the current balance of loans extended to 318 million dinars.

This balance is distributed as follows: 62.3 percent for the Housing Bank, 11.3 percent for the Industrial Development Bank, 9.9 percent for the Urban and Rural Development Bank, 6.9 percent for the Agricultural Loans Organization, 6.9 percent for the Jordanian Cooperative Organization, and 2.7 percent for the Housing Agency.

STUDY REVEALS GAPS IN FUTURE LABOR SUPPLY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 27 Jun 84 p 2

[Text] Concerned agencies at all levels acknowledge frankly that Jordan lacks a statistical base that can be used to establish the country's manpower needs according to academic level and economic sector to achieve the goals put forward in the social and economic development plans.

In addition, there are gaps in labor force statistics for the East Bank, including the distribution of manpower among the various economic sectors.

These facts are not based on a personal interpretation nor are they inspired by the admissions of an ordinary official agency. Rather, they are irrefutable facts acknowledged by the World Education Council through a study it conducted entitled, "Manpower Needs for Economic and Social Development in Jordan."

Goals of the Study

The study did not neglect to point out that in the absence of a statistical data base to establish needs and with a lack of labor force statistics, certain computational principles and rules must be relied on to establish manpower requirements for economic and social development as a temporary procedural step to overcome the inaccuracies that arise from the absence of a scientific statistical method.

Labor Situation in the East Bank

The study deals with the labor situation in the East Bank and the projected population for 1985.

The study states that because of the rate of natural population increase since the last official census in 1979, the projected population for 1985 is 2,698,916. Some 1,255,266 members of the population are expected to be from 15 to 64 years of age.

According to the 1979 census, the labor force consisted of 406,061 workers. This is 51 percent of the population in the 15-64 age group.

The results also revealed that 11.35 percent of the labor force worked in the agriculture sector, 9.43 percent worked in the industry and mining sector, 0.59 percent worked in the electricity and water sector, 15.71 percent worked in the construction sector, and 62.92 percent worked in the services sector.

Researchers and specialists represented only 6.02 percent of university graduates with bachelor's degrees. Technicians represented 6.79 percent of the degree holders and skilled and unskilled workers represented 86.35 percent of the degree holders.

Of the total 1983 labor force, which consisted of 481,566 workers, some 4,045 workers are classified as researchers, specialists, and technicians while 415,833 workers are classified as skilled and unskilled workers.

Results for 1985

Statistical trends indicate that the 1985 labor force will consist of 520,935 workers. Of this total, 4,376 workers will be research workers and specialized experts, 31,360 will hold the first university degree, 35,372 will be technicians, and 49,827 will be skilled and unskilled workers.

Demand for Labor

According to the study, results indicate that the labor force in demand in 1983 will be 605,320 workers as opposed to a previous projection of 481,566. Demand by sector is expected to be 11.8 percent in agriculture, 14.2 percent in industry and mining, 16.4 percent in construction, and 56.9 percent in services.

This labor force should consist of 1,574 research workers and specialists, 12,528 technicians, and 578,690 skilled and unskilled workers.

1985 Demand

The study reported the projected size of the labor force for 1985 and estimated the numbers that can be supplied based on the assumptions used in the study.

The study went on to define the types of workers that will be required in 1985 in order to eventually implement the necessary development plans for the Kingdom. It said that the country should supply 1,925 researchers and specialists, 15,626 university graduates, 15,626 technicians, and 707,384 skilled and unskilled workers.

Comparison

By a simple comparison, the study arrives at the fact that there was a large surplus in the numbers of research workers and specialists, university graduates holding the first degree, and technicians while there was a greater shortage in the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers for 1983. The surplus consisted of 39,103 workers while the shortage amounted to 162,857 workers for a difference of 123,754 workers.

The study indicated that this surplus of research workers and specialists, university graduates, and technicians should be reduced only slightly by 1985 while the storage of skilled and unskilled workers will increase greatly. The projected surplus is 37,931 workers while the projected shortage is 257,557.

Conclusions

The results of the study indicate that there is a large shortage of skilled and unskilled workers based on the requirements of the economic and social development plan. This shortage may be due to one of the following factors or perhaps a combination of them:

- The low rate of participation (6 percent) of females in the 15-to-64 age group in 1979.
- The system of hiring in effect in the economic sectors since this system encompassed 81 percent of the skilled and unskilled workers in 1979, 95.60 percent in 1983, and an estimated 95.52 percent in 1985.
- The failure of labor policy to reconcile the emigration of manpower to and from Jordan with the manpower levels required to meet the needs of the economic and social development plan.

Based on these facts, it is concluded that it will be difficult to achieve the goals of the economic and social development plan now being applied in the various economic sectors without the adoption of certain measures to close the large gap in the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers required by this plan. Proposed measures to accomplish this include:

- Encouraging and promoting the participation of women in economic activity.
- Reevaluating the volume of domestic production according to economic sector.
- Revising the hiring system to take into account the academic level of the workers.
- Providing an appropriate labor policy with respect to the emigration of manpower to and from Jordan.
- Taking into consideration projections of the labor force available during the years of the economic and social development plan as soon as these projections are made.

8591
CSO: 4404/547

DRINKING WATER PROJECT LARGEST IN COUNTRY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 28 Jun 84 pp 28, 23

[Text] Dr Mundhir Haddadin, president of the Jordan Valley Authority, said that the implementation of the Dayr 'Al'a-Amman water project is progressing well. In an interview with AL-DUSTUR, he said that some portions of the project have been completed and operation of the project and the pumping of water are expected to begin next February.

Dr Haddadin described the project as the largest drinking water project in Jordan and the most important project in the world in terms of its technical and topographical aspects because it involves the pumping of water from an area 200 meters below sea level to a reservoir 1,032 meters above sea level.

40 Million Dinars

Dr Haddadin added: "The pumping capacity of this project is 45 million cubic meters per year from the Eastern Depression Canal at Dayr 'Al'a to Amman. The project, which will cost 40 million dinars, will serve the needs of the region lying between the al-Walah Valley on the south and the al-Zarqa' River on the north. This area includes the cities of Amman, al-Zarqa', Madaba, and al-Salit."

Components of the Project

According to Dr Muhammad Bani Hani, vice president for irrigation and drinking water affairs, the project will pump water from the Eastern Depression Canal at Dayr 'Al'a and [will include] construction of a water intake and a 1,200-millimeter (48-inch) main pumping line 29 kilometers in length. The pipeline will extend from Dayr 'Al'a to the main reservoir north of the medical city. The project includes a second pipeline from the main reservoir to a reservoir located near the al-Husayn City for Youth. This pipeline will be 1,000 millimeters in diameter and 10 kilometers long. The project provides for a third pipeline from the reservoir at the al-Husayn City for Youth to the al-Azraq pipeline at 'Ayn Ghazal. This pipeline is 200 millimeters in diameter and extends 10 kilometers.

Pumping Stations

The project includes five pumping stations, the first of which will pump from the water intake at the Dayr 'Al'a area to an elevation of 19 meters. From this point, there are four pumping stations each of which pumps 286 meters of elevation. Another station pumps the water an additional 197 meters of elevation. Each pumping station contains four electric pumps. There is a purification station in the Zayy area in addition to the main reservoir north of the medical city of al-Husayn, which is located at an altitude of 1,032 meters above sea level.

With regard to the cost of the project and its various phases, Dr Bani Hani said: "The total cost of the project is approximately 40 million dinars, which includes training programs, studies, supervision, consulting, and surveying."

He said that the pipeline for the project is expected to be completed by 19 July. This portion of the project will cost approximately 14 million dinars.

The purification station, which will cost an estimated 7 million dinars, will be completed by the end of next February.

The pumping stations are expected to be completed some time during October at a cost of approximately 7 million dinars.

The power line, which will cost approximately 500,000 dinars, is expected to be completed next October.

The vice president of the Jordan Valley Authority for irrigation and drinking water affairs explained: "There are programs to train the Jordanian organization that will operate this project and the Irbid water project. A number of Jordanian engineers and technicians have been sent to the United States for training, and some experts have been brought in to train the cadres at the project sites."

8591

CSO: 4404/547

BRIEFS

WORKFORCE STATISTICS--There were some 427,733 men and women in the Jordanian workforce in various economic activities last year. The workers are distributed among economic activities in the kingdom as follows: 41,302 in agriculture; 8,966 in mining and mines; 41,984 in industry; 6,545 in water and electricity; 57,788 in construction; 42,134 in commerce; 36,522 in transportation, communications, and supply; 11,409 in financial services, insurance, and real estate; and 181,083 in public administration and other services. The statistics mentioned here do not include foreigners working in Jordan. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 26 Jun 84 p 2] 8591

ISLAMIC BANK LOAN--The responsible authorities received a telegram from the Islamic Bank in Jiddah notifying of the bank's agreement to offer Jordan a loan of \$15 million. It was learned that the loan will be used in financing crude oil purchases from Saudi Arabia. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Jun 84 p 26] 8591

CSO: 4404/547

MOSCOW, BEIRUT DRAW CLOSER

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 387, 21 Jul 84 p 15

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Soviets Partiality Toward Lebanon"]

[Text] The cancellation of the 17 May accord between Lebanon and Israel marked a major turning point in Soviet policy toward the Lebanese state, the policy of the Lebanese Government itself, and even Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil.

In the view of the Soviet capital, Lebanon's decision to cancel the 17 May accord was tantamount to a blow that frustrated Washington's plans for the Middle East, especially those that had to do with the Camp David policy and President Reagan's proposed solution to the Palestinian problem, which was to be executed through Jordan.

The Soviet leaders had declared several times that the 17 May agreement was part of the Camp David policy and the Reagan plan. They said it all amounted to a framework through which Washington wished to strengthen its control and positions in the Arab world.

Thus, Moscow does not look at the cancellation of the accord as merely the end of an agreement on an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Rather, it sees in the cancellation a painful blow to the strategy of the United States of America in the Arab Middle East, as well as a victory for Soviet policy in this vital region of the world.

On top of the rubble of the strategic significance of the 17 May accord, Moscow is currently trying to establish a new policy of its own in dealing with Lebanon and its crisis, and even with its rulers and system of government. It is showing itself to be ready to offer more support and backing and to contribute more to the dissolution of the complexities of the Lebanese crisis, as long as the policy of Lebanon is taking firm and advanced steps in resistance to the policies imposed by Camp David and the 17 May accord.

Lebanese officials frankly admit to the positive role Moscow is playing by contributing to the success of the security plan in Greater Beirut and pushing the Syrian Government to abandon many of its reservations and offer what support it can to the Lebanese President and his new government.

Today, the French know more than any other international party about the circumstances and standpoints of the Soviet decision-making apparatus, which is prepared to go the last mile in support of the Lebanese cause and in backing up its orientations under the new policy of the government of Prime Minister Karami.

At the beginning of last May, the secretary general of the French Ministry of External Relations, Mr Gutmann, met with an official Lebanese personality close to President Amin al-Jumayyil. The French official was just returning from Moscow, following an official visit whose goal was to prepare the way for the visit of President Mitterand to Moscow, which took place later.

Mr Gutmann had this to say to the Lebanese personality: "It is important for me to inform you of an important Soviet position on the Lebanese question. It is a position from which you can derive benefit in dealing with your complex problems and working out solutions to them."

The secretary general of the French Ministry of External Relations added, "I made a visit to Moscow, and I am returning from there now. High Soviet officials told me that the Soviet Union is betting on President Amin al-Jumayyil, whom it considers to be the man who can devise a final solution to the Lebanese problem. Moscow is ready to grant him every kind of support and to provide him with backing with which to solve the problem of his country, thereby assuring the safety, independence, and unity of Lebanon."

The aforementioned Lebanese personality immediately transmitted to President Amin al-Jumayyil the details of the conversation conveyed from Moscow by the secretary general of the French Ministry of External Relations.

Although the Lebanese President was not very surprised by this Soviet position on himself in particular and the Lebanese problem in general, he seemed very pleased by this Soviet stance, which gives the wager on the Syrian-Arab solution in Lebanon powerful support and a large international dimension.

After that, indications of Soviet backing and support for the government's steps followed one after the other. Finally, the Soviets took a unique step with respect to Lebanon by having the official NOVOSTI news agency distribute a lengthy article that seemed to be very well thought out and composed with care. It presented a Soviet offer to outfit and arm the Lebanese army and assure Lebanon's unity and independence. After that, the NOVOSTI article launched a violent attack on the plans of Washington and Israel in Lebanon. It blamed this policy for preventing the establishment of stability in Lebanon and spilling more Lebanese blood. It then referred to Moscow's policy, which has supported Lebanese independence and sovereignty from the beginning. The article affirmed that the Soviet Union is now firm in its policy and determined to back the unity of the Lebanese against the Israeli occupiers.

The article presented an official Soviet offer to equip and prepare the Lebanese army. It evinced Soviet readiness to import many local Lebanese products, thereby forming a solid foundation of support for the Lebanese economy, which was sapped by the false American assistance that snatched the bill for equipping the Lebanese army and extracted millions of dollars from the Lebanese budget. This budget already suffers from a deficit as a result of the internal events and the absence of many treasury resources.

Finally the NOVOSTI article contained a Soviet appeal to Lebanon to emerge from the whirlpool of its desire for a special relationship with what is called the Free World. The Soviets called on Lebanon to end its dependency on those who are trying to erase that country.

According to observers, this offer is a unique step for the Soviet Union to take vis-a-vis the Lebanese state. Through it, the Soviets may also be trying to reach the other Middle Eastern countries that are bound to America by good relations. Like Lebanon, they are complaining of their fear for their existence and structures at a time when the Middle East region is being flooded by a wave of wars and violent disturbances.

However, although days have passed since this Soviet offer was made, so far no official response has been forthcoming from Lebanon on this subject. Neither a positive nor a negative answer has been made. However, a prominent Lebanese official has confirmed that this official silence on the Soviet offer should not be interpreted as being a negative, cautious position, because the offer has been positively received by high Lebanese authorities. These authorities are currently engaged in studying it precisely with the goal of determining the Lebanese point of view on it. In particular, they want to determine their stance on the areas of economic and military assistance which the Soviet Union could provide to Lebanon, in addition to political support.

Informed parties do not consider it unlikely that the Lebanese Government could decide to buy ammunition and military equipment from the Soviet Union, in accordance with the circumstances and potential of the Lebanese Army. With respect to training and the utilization of weapons, however, the army follows the Western model.

The Lebanese Government might encounter some difficulty on this level, especially since a precedent of this kind exists. At the beginning of the term of the last president, Sulayman Franjiyah, whose cabinet was headed by Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, the Lebanese Government purchased Soviet weapons. At that time, the minister of defense in that government, Dr Ilyas Saba, traveled to Moscow.

Aside from this Lebanese precedent, there is currently a new climate in the region in which conservative Arab countries are turning toward the Soviet Union in order to further their economic and commercial relations. The latest such development is the signing of an agreement by Kuwait and the Soviet Union according to which Kuwait will buy advanced Soviet military equipment and weapons.

In this climate and atmosphere, Lebanon will find it easy to abandon many reservations it feels with respect to establishing new bridges in terms of economic and political relations with a great nation like the Soviet Union, which can be expected to play a great role as a partner in the creation of solutions to the problems of the region and in the establishment of new political balances in the area.

12224
CSO: 4404/576

LEBANON

RISE IN TREASURY NOTE RATE CAUSES UPROAR

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 385, 7 Jul 84 pp 60-61

[Article: "The Lost Link Between the Pound, the Dollar and Lebanese Treasury Notes"]

[Text] When the Ministry of Finance recently raised the interest on treasury notes by two points all at once, the world did not hold back. An outcry was raised whose effects, unfortunately, were not recorded, because of the rise of the American dollar to over 605 Lebanese piasters. The decision to raise the interest came about as if it were a serious occurrence and an unusual matter in contemporary nations in monetary and fiscal affairs. The reaction was unusual and not limited to just one matter, but rather, it dealt with several matters. The minister of finance, president Camille Chamoun, disavowed his ministry's decision and declared that he "knew nothing about this decision," and that the rise in the interest rate was decided before he took over the ministry's duties. Auguste Bakhus, chairman of the parliamentary committee on administration and justice, put a question to the government, which included previous opposition to the decision before he received its reply to his allegation, all of which strongly suggests partisanship. Even all the banks in Lebanon, perhaps for the first time, did not hide their opposition to the decision, and tacitly alluded to that through their statements that the high interest rate was damaging the Lebanese economy. As for industrialists and merchants who had every right not to participate in the opposition, in view of the effect of the decision on civilian interest rates, they expressed opposition, although within logical limits. The question that poses itself is: Why this unjustified outcry? To whose benefit was this climate raised over a decision to raise the interest, which was aimed first and last at protecting the exchange rate of the pound? What doubts were raised about this measure, in order to make it appear as if it were taken arbitrarily and in an impromptu fashion? Before answering these questions, one must put the Ministry of Finance's decision into its true context through the following data:

1. The decision was adopted by the Ministry of Finance, either with the knowledge or without the knowledge of the minister, Camille Chamoun; it makes no difference, since he has delegated some of his powers to the director general of the Ministry of Finance.

2. Raising the interest was aimed at encouraging the banks to subscribe to treasury notes, after they had declined to subscribe except for one-half of what they had earned from previous issues. The Treasury had a financial need, which required avoiding a shortfall in the balance of treasury notes, for fear of having to resort to borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon.

3. At the same time, raising the interest was aimed at supporting the exchange rate of the pound, which was subjected to pressures and open speculation beginning 1 June, which led to the dollar rising to 605 piasters. The measure was a supplement to another measure adopted by the Bank of Lebanon, through its intervention in the exchange market and its purchase of about \$150 million over a 5 day period, in order to combat vicious speculation into which some of the financial centers both at home and abroad entered. The banks' refusal to subscribe to treasury notes came after this intervention, so as to show determination to continue this speculation and to combat the Bank of Lebanon. This would have led to the exhaustion of its foreign currency reserves and to the conversion of the bought dollars at a new high for the pockets of the speculators.

4. The sudden rise in interest by 2 percent was aimed at giving the decision a relative influence, since its fulfillment would have been difficult if the rise was a gradual one, as is the assumption in the usual case. The conditions that prevailed required that; there was no other option.

5. Raising the interest on treasury notes is not new. On the contrary, it is a normal, widespread practice, used by most nations, even the United States which is a leader in this field. Financing the treasury's deficit through treasury notes is the principal reason for the dollar's high rates, which has upset and is still upsetting the European community.

6. The decision was issued by the committee from which it must be issued. It is empowered by the Finance Ministry, in accordance with its authority and in accordance with the budget law, to issue notes to the extent required by the budget deficit.

7. The monetary and fiscal authorities are responsible for protecting the exchange rate of the pound by the means available to them. If security is the best means to support the pound, this means is not at the disposal of the fiscal and monetary authorities. On the contrary, it is at the disposal of others, and at the disposal of some of those who oppose the decision. Always, and on every similar occasion, it is said for the Bank of Lebanon that security is what is required and not raising the interest rate, as if the Bank of Lebanon and the Ministry of Finance were behind the security explosions and were behind everything that has happened and is happening for the last 9 years in Lebanon.

8. Talk about the influence of the decision on the interest rates for the civilians who face difficult circumstances is from "Tabaki's" door on their interests. The banks breached their contracts with civilians when the interest rate was raised on treasury notes, and forgot all their dealings during previous times. Those who are opposed to the decision were kindly

disposed towards the civilians for a day, and refrained from shelling the factories, destroying the institutions, blocking roads and opening illegal ports in order to compete with local production. If there were a policy to help the civilians, let it be in an objective and sound framework, free from the "Tabaki" method.

9. It is true that the decision has negative ramifications for civilians who are incapable of paying, but raising the exchange rate has certain ramifications on all citizens, in view of the fact that the lowering of the pound contributes to the rise in the cost of living. Why haven't the opponents of this decision emphasized the positive instead of the many negative issues that they have raised? If raising the interest on loans hurts specific groups, raising the cost of living hurts all groups without exception.

10. It has been proven that the influence of raising the interest on the cost of production is much less than the effect of raising the exchange rate on the cost of commodities most of which are imported or manufactured locally out of imported raw materials, whose cost rises whenever the dollar rises. So long as the consumer always bears the higher costs which are added to the selling price, he must therefore be aware of the option that causes the burden.

11. It is true that the action of the Finance Ministry, and before that the intervention of the Bank of Lebanon in the exchange market, did not result in improvement in the rate of the pound, but it did stop its deterioration. Since the intervention, the price of the dollar has continued to fluctuate between 600 and 605 piasters, and has not gone beyond this limit, despite speculation, because the Bank of Lebanon was prepared to intervene whenever the rate exceeded the 605 piaster ceiling. If political developments had been positive, the pound's exchange rate would have improved as desired. Therefore, the action prevented additional deterioration.

This data does not mean that the Finance Ministry's decision was 100 percent positive, since any decision, no matter what kind, has its negative and positive aspects. Undoubtedly the decision's negative aspects are manifested in two points:

1. It results in a rise in interest rates on credit, which will then be reflected in a rise in commodity prices, and then will affect employment. However, new employment is 95 percent suspended due to circumstances, and production has unfortunately become imported for the most part.

2. It gives the impression that the government is unable to fulfill the banks' obligations, except by raising interest rates in a significant way, which gives the impression of a lack of confidence. However, this does not cancel out the positive points of the decision. The matter was dealt with positively, the pros and cons were reviewed, and appropriate actions were taken. But all of that does not remove the questions about the position adopted by Minister of Finance Camille Chamoun:

1. Why did the minister of finance publicly disclaim the decision, knowing that that does not relieve him of the responsibility, even if he had no knowledge of it? What is his position regarding the director general of finance who adopted the decisions on the responsibility of the minister, whether he had been delegated the authority or not?
2. Why did he say that the decision on interest was taken before his assumption of duties? Was it to suggest it was suspicious? Is it logical that the Ministry of Finance would decide on such and such a date that the interest rates would go up, knowing that interest rates are set within hours and in accordance with new developments which change from week to week?
3. How can the minister of finance not know about the decision to raise the interest rate, while the director general takes the initiative to postpone the action for another week, after the finance minister's statement? Is it possible for the director of finance to persist in that even though the minister of finance has publicly declared his opposition to that decision?
4. By his statement, was the finance minister trying to avoid the opposition, whether it was raised by the banks or the industrialists and merchants?
5. Does the position of the finance minister contain political objectives, and what are these goals?

No matter what the reasons and motives, the finance minister's position has left doubts about the decision, or rather, it gravely damages it, because those concerned have been left up in the air over the possibility that the interest rates will be re-considered in the short term. This will seriously hurt the effectiveness of any decision that might be taken later. Moreover, the outcry that was raised only reflects the condition that the country is now in.

7005
CSO: 4404/562

LEBANON

INVESTMENT COMPANY BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN TROUBLE

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 65, 7 Jul 84 p 61

[Article: "INTRA Board of Directors Threatened With Disbandment"]

[Text] When the general assembly of the INTRA Investment Company met on 13 August 1983 to elect a new board of directors, observers and those who follow the financial course of this company, which is considered the largest and most important in Lebanon, called attention to the absence of the company's Arab representatives. They are Qatar's representative, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qadhi, the representative of Kuwait, Khalid Abu al-Sa'ud, and the representative of the Kuwait National Bank, Muhammad al-Kharafi.

When the newly elected chairman of INTRA's Board of Directors, Rujih Tamarraz, was questioned about the reasons for this Arab absence, his reply was that the absence was for reasons connected with the difficulty of transporting the representatives of Qatar and Kuwait, as well as the representative of the Bank of Kuwait, to Lebanon, due to the closure of the Beirut International Airport and not for any other reason.

Mr Tamarraz's reply that day was sufficient to silence the questions that were in fact in the minds of some about the truth of the reasons for this absence, since Beirut airport was in fact closed. In addition, the redesignating of the representatives of Qatar, Kuwait and the Kuwait National Bank as being among the newly installed Board of Directors of INTRA helped allay suspicions to a considerable extent. However, the questions that existed during the elections about the truth of the Arab position concerning the INTRA Company were strongly re-awakened, as a result of the reports that began to circulate a few months later about the Qatar-Kuwaiti desire to sell their shares to the Kuwait National Bank. These shares amounted to 39 percent. These reports stated that no sooner had the Qatar-Kuwaiti position been officially conveyed to the Lebanese government, than that government hastened to make urgent diplomatic contacts with Kuwait in order to find out the background to this position, in view of its negative ramifications not only on the INTRA Company's financial position, but also on the general political situation in Lebanon. The presence of two such stockholders as Qatar and Kuwait in a Lebanese financial organization, after all that has happened in Lebanon, had a positive political significance in addition to its financial and economic advantages.

In fact, a few days later, the Lebanese government issued a denial through INTRA Company circles with respect to these reports about the Qatar-Kuwaiti desire to sell their stock in the INTRA Company. The chairman of INTRA, Rujih Tamarraz, made a special visit to Kuwait, as proof that no disputes existed between the company and the Kuwaiti government, which along with the Kuwait National Bank owns 23 percent of the total INTRA stock.

However, these assurances did not stand up for long since, beginning in March 1984, they began to recede little by little, along with the appearance of new and this time decisive proof of the Kuwaiti-Qatari opposition to the new INTRA Board of Directors and especially to its chairman. This evidence was represented by the Kuwaiti government's strong opposition to one of the deals made recently by the chairman of the INTRA Company (the purchase of the Morgan Bank's share in the Orient Bank for an amount said to be in excess of \$40 million. On that day, specifically in the middle of last May, the Lebanese government wrote to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry requesting the abrogation of this deal, and the second that it was done illegally, specifically because it was contrary to the position of the INTRA Board of Directors since, in concluding this deal, its chairman had exceeded the powers that the board had given him.

At that time, it was rumored that the Kuwaiti and Qatari governments had agreed to conclude a truce with Mr Tamarraz, but ultimately it did not, pending a comprehensive reconsideration of the composition of the Board of Directors, especially since it included some members who were part time, contrary to the agreement concluded between Lebanon and the governments of Qatar and Kuwait when the INTRA Bank was re-consolidated at the end of the 60's, and the agreement to establish the INTRA Investment Company. That agreement noted the need for the chairman of the Board of Directors of the new company, and the members, to be full time, even if relatively, which is currently not the case in a limited way in the current composition of the INTRA board, since 3 of the 12 board members reside permanently outside of Lebanon. In addition, the chairman of the board himself resides most of the time outside of Lebanon, since his main headquarters is in Paris and New York.

If the Lebanese government succeeded in persuading the Arab shareholders in INTRA to conclude a truce with the current Board of Directors and, consequently, succeeded in containing the repercussions of this dispute on the continuation of the new board, it did however have to face a Lebanese-Lebanese crisis inside INTRA in the middle of last month, represented by three members of the board submitting their resignations for various reasons. It was announced that the resignations of two members were accepted. They were Robert Sursoq and Khaldun Suwaydah, for personal reasons relating to circumstances of their work, since both of them worked outside of Lebanon, specifically in Paris in the banking sector.

As for the third resignation on the Board of Directors, it was from Fu'ad Bahsuli. However, this resignation was for different reasons than the previous two. It was done in protest over several practices by INTRA's chairman, such as his unilaterally making important decisions without referring

to the Board of Directors, including ratification of the Morgan Bank deal and involvement with the "First Venetian [Phonetic] Bank." This was the bank that collapsed a few weeks ago and was taken over by the Lebanese Central Bank. With the resignation of the three Lebanese members of the Board of Directors, in addition to the suspension of membership of the Arab members (three members), the INTRA board, including its chairman, became threatened with ouster. It was obvious that the Lebanese government, which with the Bank of Lebanon owns 44 percent of the company's total stock, no longer had any option except to try to find a substitute board which would satisfy the Arab interests in the company and which would also be appropriate for the new Lebanese political composition following the February war, in terms of the composition of its Lebanese members.

It should be mentioned that the INTRA Investment Company (with a capital of 280 million Lebanese pounds), owns a large number of subsidiary and associated firms (22), and is considered one of the largest and strongest financial organizations in Lebanon and the Middle East. One of the largest firms belonging to it is Middle East Airlines. INTRA's percentage of stock in that company is 62.5 percent. It also owns the Lebanese Casino Company (51.2 percent) the Bank of Kuwait and the Arab World (96.65 percent), Real Estate Bank of Lebanon (66.09 percent), Finance, Real Estate of the Port of Beirut (50.04 percent), and the Bank of Finance (98.42 percent).

7005

CSO: 4404/562

AIRLINES LOSE 1 BILLION POUNDS SINCE 1975

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 64, 30 Jun 84 p 61

[Article by Ibrahim 'Awadah: "Billion Pounds Lost by Middle East and Trans-Mediterranean Airlines; Beirut Airport Closed for 22 Months Since 1975"]

[Text] The international airlines industry has been through a significant recession during the past 4 years, specifically since 1979, due to the energy crisis and the 300 percent increase in oil prices, which has affected and will affect the volume of sales in the airlines industry. However, according to the expectations of the director general of IAT, Mr F. Hammarschold, the industry will register a slight .05 percent increase this year. The airline crisis in Lebanon, in addition to the international reasons stemming basically from the energy crisis, also had domestic causes that increased the size of its problems and the size of the dangers, which are impeding the industry's continuity, due to the continuing effects of those local problems lurking in the background.

In addition to this important difference between the causes of the international airlines crisis and the Lebanese airlines crisis, there is another important difference represented in the duration of this crisis and in the possibilities of the future. The Lebanese airlines industry crisis preceded the international airlines industry crisis by about 4 years. It goes back to the middle of 1975, the date of the beginning of the Lebanese war. Moreover, the Lebanese airlines industry faces the murkiness of the future, in view of the murky political and security situations in Lebanon.

Since the onset of the Lebanese war in the middle of 1975, the two Lebanese airlines, Middle East Airlines (MEA) which handles passengers, and Trans-Mediterranean Airlines (TMA) which handles freight, have both faced continual losses as a result of the security conditions prevailing for some 9 years in Lebanon. This was and still is the cause of the closure of Beirut International Airport for long periods of time, which has impacted on the size of the two companies' operations. Beirut International Airport has been closed to air traffic since February 1984 and still is. It was closed to air traffic for a total of about 20 months since the beginning of the Lebanese war, i.e., almost 2 years. This has caused both Lebanese airlines to suffer large financial losses which, for MEA, amount to about 600 million pounds, while TMA

losses amounted to about 400 million pounds. According to statistics issued by the board of MEA at the end of 1983, on every day that the airport was inoperative, the company lost 1.5 million Lebanese pounds, i.e., its total losses throughout the periods of the airport's closure during the war years, 20 months, amounted to about 900 million Lebanese pounds, part of which was compensated for by the company's success in operating some of its flights outside of Beirut International Airport (Damascus and Larnaca) during the period of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, since the airport was closed for 115 days, from 6 June, the date of the invasion, up to 3 September. This resulted in some reduction in its losses from 900 million Lebanese pounds to about 600 or 700 million pounds. The company's losses in 1982 alone were 187.53 million Lebanese pounds after having lost 135.74 million pounds in 1981.

In addition to this, the company was hit by losses in its fleet of aircraft, since the Israeli invasion caused the destruction of 5 Boeing 707s and damage to six other aircraft. With regard to TMA, its board states that the company's financial losses, resulting from the drawdown in its operations, amounted to about 300 million Lebanese pounds during the past 4 years. These losses are likely to increase, due to the continuation of the security conditions, which constrict the expansion of this company's operations out of Beirut International Airport.

If MEA even today has succeeded, at a minimum, in standing fast, that was not merely a coincidence or pure luck, but it is due to a group of reasons, the most important being:

1. The Lebanese Government's giving support to this company, since it, that is the government, owns 62.5 percent of its stock (the INTRA Investment Company). The state provided the company with two long-term financial loans, with a total value of 200 million pounds. That was in 1983 and 1984.
2. The company's success, thanks to its excellent world reputation and the fixed assets that it owns, in obtaining some loans from international and Lebanese banks.
3. Management's reduction of its administrative expenses, especially with respect to its employees' salaries. There are about 600 employees and officials. Since last February, the firm has cut its employees' salaries by 50 percent, which has provided it with a monthly cash savings of about 7 million pounds.
4. The company's success, with the government's help, in operating regular flights out of Damascus and Larnaca airports during 1982, which reduced the size of its financial losses. This was in addition to this company's success in leasing three Boeing aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

If MEA enjoyed some support and assistance from the Lebanese Government to maintain the continuity of its operations, TMA has not received such support, since it is a private company with no government connection. This is a matter that threatens and affects the continuity of this company's operations. A month ago, the company transferred the headquarters of its operations from Beirut

Airport to the al-Shariqah Airport, in order to lessen its losses. Moreover, beginning in June, the firm has been paying 25 percent of the salaries of its workers and employees, of whom there are about 600.

In the face of this frightening and everpresent reality, the two Lebanese airlines have come up with the idea of achieving a total merger between the two firms, in order to reduce their losses and with the goal of opening the way for expansion of their operations. This idea has received unofficial approval both from within the Lebanese Government and outside of it, such as the chairman of the Board of Directors of the INTRA Investment Company, Mr Rujih Tamarraz. On the other hand, it has been received with reservations, if not opposition, by the MEA management, which does not look kindly on an absolute merger, although in principle it does not oppose limited cooperation between the two companies.

The MEA management thinks surfacing the merger plan today is inopportune, especially since the problems of the two airlines in Lebanon stem basically from the security conditions that have prevailed since 1975. The problem is security and not a question of merger. Consequently, solving the problem for both companies remains dependent on the security situation. When the Lebanese crisis is ended, the two firms will be able to operate under suitable security circumstances from Beirut Airport. This will enable both of them to expand the scope of their operations and, thus, to reduce the size of their losses and make reasonable profits, as was the case before the start of the incidents. This could be done while retaining the principle of limited cooperation between the two firms.

7005

CSO: 4404/561-A

LEBANON

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN FOREIGN WORKERS--The Lebanese General Labor Federation has warned the government about the danger of the increase in the foreign labor force, since its percentage has begun to approximate the percentage of Lebanese workers (more than 175,000 workers). In a note that it sent to the Minister of Labor, Dr Salim al-Huss, the federation called for a freeze on granting work permits to foreigners before seeking its advice, since unemployment in the ranks of Lebanese labor is about 60 percent. This threatens to become a socio-economic tragedy unless it is corrected as soon as possible. In its note, the federation made it clear that the percentage of foreign workers in the industrial sector today amounts to 40 or 50 percent, with a similar figure in the health services sector, while it is 100 percent in the construction sector and 80 percent in the tourist trade. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 65, 7 Jul 84 p 60] 7005

DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL HEAD RESIGNATION--The chief of the Lebanese Development and Reconstruction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, has submitted his resignation to the prime minister. Dr 'Atallah, who has occupied the post of head of the council since its inception in 1977, offered no explanation in his letter of resignation concerning the reasons that caused him to take this position. It was learned that Dr Muhammad 'Atallah after he leaves the council has decided to work in the private sector (the banking sector). He had previously worked for a long time in that sector. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 65, 7 Jul 84 p 60] 7005

DROP IN CUSTOMS REVENUES--The head of the Supreme Customs Council in Lebanon, Dr 'Assam Haydar, announced that during the past 5 months, the Lebanese Treasury has lost 90 percent of its customs revenues. Dr Haydar stated that the reason for this loss was the re-opening of the illegal ports and the closure of the port of Beirut and Beirut International Airport for security reasons last February. The chairman of the council stated that last May's revenues totaled more than 13.5 million pounds, compared with 20 million pounds in May 1983. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 64, 30 Jun 84 p 60] 7005

POR OF SIDON IMPORTS--During the first quarter of the current year, Lebanese treasury receipts from the Port of Sidon were about 2.54 million Lebanese pounds, as proceeds from tariffs on imported goods. It is well known that the Port of Sidon has been closed more than once by Israeli authorities as one of the arbitrary actions which these authorities take against the people of the South. Most of the ships which anchor in the Port of Sidon carry various goods, the most important of which are black mortar, chemical fertilizers, sesame, rice, and cars. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 386, 14 Jul 84 p 36] 12547

GAS STORAGE IN TRIPOLI--A concession was recently awarded to start work in the Tripoli refinery on a sea line project aimed at enabling establishments to receive ships carrying liquified gas and to unload the gas into storage tanks by means of a sea pipe. The concession was given to one of the local companies after it had submitted the lowest bid. Implementation will take several months, after which the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum will be able to store gas and partially dispense with the private storage facilities which it rents in the surrounding area. The cost of the marine gasoline project is estimated to be about 2 million Lebanese pounds. On another subject, it is finally expected that production will resume at the Tripoli refinery in the middle of the current month of July, the date previously set under the framework of the program to repair the refinery, which sustained extensive damage as a result of the tragic events at the end of last year. During the first stage, production will begin at about 20 to 25 million tons a day, and during this first stage priority will be given to fuel oil and mazut, and from there to gasoline and ordinary kerosene. Airplane fuel (kerosene) will not be produced at this stage, which means that aircraft companies in the case of the airport reopening, will be forced to fill their storage tanks from abroad. Storage capacity at the Tripoli refinery has reached 75,000 tons for various derivatives in the initial production period. In spite of that, after repairs the Tripoli refinery will revert to its former state rather than how it should be--considering that its progress is contained by economic and technical considerations. [text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 385, 7 Jul 84 p 57] 12547

SOUTH LEBANON EXPORTS--The value of Lebanese exports with origins confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce in Sayda' in southern Lebanon for the first half of this year was 7 million pounds. This compares with a figure of 12 million pounds for the same period last year. That is, a decline of about 5 million pounds has occurred. In other words, exports have fallen by 42 percent. It is clear that the decline in the flow of exports has been going on since the Israeli invasion. It grew worse after the escalation of national resistance and the closing of the crossings. Though exporting is maintaining a minimum level across the south, re-exporting has just about ceased altogether. However, it is interesting to note that exports to Saudi Arabia were worth 650,000 pounds last June, after having disappeared in the last 2 months. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 387, 21 Jul 84 p 32] 12224

CSO: 4404/576

SYRIA SAID TO SUPPORT FRENCH ROLE IN REGION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 387, 21 Jul 84 p 23

[Article by Marwan al-Mahayini: "Syria Supports a Purely French Initiative"]

[Text] Reports of the fighting that broke out suddenly in north Lebanon have been received with great despair and regret in Damascus, which hastened to deal with the situation immediately. President al-Asad sent Maj Gen Muhammad al-Khuli to Zagharta, where he met former President Sulayman Franjiyah and called on the two sides to stop the fighting, since both are comrades in a patriotic struggle and stand in the same line in Lebanon's battle against its enemies.

Later on, President al-Asad received Mr Robert Franjiyah, who brought him a letter from his father. He also met Mr In'am Ra'd and a number of leaders from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Later, a meeting was held in the office of Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, the vice president of the republic. It was attended by Mr Ra'd and Mr Franjiyah. During it, the foundations were laid for a halt to the fighting and a resolution of the matters at stake in the areas of fighting in northern Lebanon. Both sides were eager to affirm the absence of any serious disputes. They stated that the fighting had come about as a result of personal matters.

Mr In'am Ra'd, the chairman of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, had this to say to AL-MUSTAQBAL after his meeting with President al-Asad: "During the last few years, we have been eager to have relations of cooperation and alliance with former President Franjiyah, since we respect his patriotic stand against partition and the policy of the Phalange, as well as his good relations with our brother country Syria and President Hafiz al-Asad. However, we want the alliance to be based on openness and mutual respect. The events of 1975 shaped the district in which our party is active. It interacts more with Tripoli than any other Christian region, and without any sectarian problems. After 1978, it formed a bridge of love between Zgharta and Tripoli. In our policy, we are very eager to have relations with former President Franjiyah and Zgharta, but we want them to be based on a concept of alliance, openness and mutual respect. Moreover, we see former President Franjiyah as a nationalist, not as a noble from Zgharta. We want to express again our deep thanks for President al-Asad's initiative. He has bound up the wound of the north and taken care to have our party meet with the leadership of the al-Muradah Brigade. This concern is part and parcel of Syria's policy of reconciling all the opponents in Lebanon. How can such disputes exist among allies? This Syrian policy enjoys our great respect. We support it and thank Syria for it."

Meanwhile, the talks held by Mr Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, in Damascus did not produce results worth mentioning. President al-Asad did not receive Minister Cheysson.

Official Syrian sources mentioned that the visit did produce some results on the level of the deteriorating bilateral relations between the two countries. However, their points of view concerning France's role and activity in the region remained far apart. These sources told AL-MUSTAQBAL that, "French activity lacks a strategic dimension. It is characterized by being dependent on the American position. It does not fulfill Arab aspirations."

The sources added that if France wanted to take part effectively in the search for a lasting and just solution in the Middle East and Lebanon, it had to come up with an independent French initiative with its own foundations and points of reference quite apart from the American view of things.

The sources pointed out that Syria sincerely wants France in particular and Europe in general to play a positive and active role in the struggle in the region, on the condition that they not think with an American intellect and not look for ways of applying the American policy positions.

It is expected that Dr Rif'at al-Asad, vice president of the republic, will make an official visit to France immediately after his return to Damascus from Switzerland, where he is undergoing some medical tests.

In addition, Damascus hosted the meeting of the speakers of the Arab parliaments. Mr Mahmud al-Zu'bi, the speaker of the People's Assembly, opened the meeting last Monday. He launched a violent attack on the United States and its biased policy in the region, saying, "America is always the source of the aggression." Al-Zu'bi sent special greetings to the Arab Gulf countries because of their stand on the attempts to widen the Gulf War. Their position frustrated the attempts at interference and exploitation made by America under the guise of protecting the region, since these countries announced that the responsibility and duty of defending the Gulf belonged to the natives of the region alone. Al-Zu'bi also sent a special greeting to the people of Egypt. He called on our Egyptian brothers to work to bring about the end of the treaty with Israel and the Camp David accords. He said, "We trust that Arab Egypt is capable of shaking off her chain and ending the obstacle that has deprived it of its pan-Arab role." The speaker of the People's Assembly criticized the Reagan plan, saying it was meant to cause confusion and fragmentation in Arab ranks in general and the ranks of the Palestinians in particular.

He added: "The seriousness of this stage requires us to be truthful with ourselves and decisive in determining the ways in which we must contribute. Verbal solidarity will not benefit us, and superficial agreements will not repel aggression from us. The circumstances to come will be difficult. The battle is going on now. However, Syria's experience in steadfastness has shown that it is possible to defeat our enemies." He referred to the fact that Lebanon, a divided and occupied country, was able to annul an agreement, by virtue of its steadfastness and the support of Syria. The agreement in question was

actually more dangerous than the Camp David Accords. Lebanon was able to expose the weakness and falseness of the American position. He warned against any obstruction of the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. Such an obstruction will benefit Israel alone and help its occupation of the south to continue.

He affirmed Syria's determination to support the government of Lebanon in the execution of the reconciliation program and the reestablishment of normal life in the country.

12224
CSO: 4404/576

SYRIA

SYRIAN AIRLINE DIRECTOR TALKS ABOUT NEW ROUTES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 386, 14 Jul 84 pp 41-42

[Interview with 'Adnan al-Jabi by Hanan al-Sharif in Damascus: "Modern Airplanes, Modern Installations, New Routes"; date not specified]

[Text] Air Force Major General 'Adnan al-Jabi used to hold the position of deputy commander of the Air Force in Syria before he became president of the board of directors and general director of the Syrian Arab Airline Company.

With 'Adnan al-Jabi in his new position, Syria has put the right man in the right place, for the man has broad experience in the world of airplanes, and from his previous position, as a soldier, he has the sternness necessary to guide the Syrian civilian airline.

AL-MUSTAQBAL conversed with 'Adnan al-Jabi the Air Force major general and al-Jabi, the person, and held a discussion with 'Adnan al-Jabi the person earnestly concerned with the welfare of his country. To begin with, he said:

"It must be said that the Syrian Arab Airline Company is considered one of the most important and sensitive vital facilities, and for that reason it plays a prominent role in revealing the nation's bright side. It forms an important and vital economic pillar supporting the economy of the country, and it is the traveling ambassador to all the countries in which it operates. Therefore, we continuously strive to occupy a prominent position among the international airlines, and from here it can be said that the company has the interest and support of the president of the republic in order to occupy a good position among the international airlines."

AL-MUSTAQBAL: How many airplanes do you have operating along all routes? 'Adnan al-Jabi: Our fleet consists of 13 airplanes distributed in the following manner:

Two Jumbo 747 SB's, 3 Boeing 727's, 2 Caravelles, 2 of the 134 type, and 4 Yak 40's. These airplanes operate along a network with 36 stops distributed among the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe. And of course we have 36 offices to take care of reservations and the arrival and departure of airplanes. We have 62 weekly flights, not counting demonstration flights.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: People are saying that your company has agreed to buy new airplanes from the Soviet Union. What is the truth behind this talk? What is the number of the airplanes? And do you intend to open up new stops for the Syrian Airlines?

'Adnan al-Jabi: An agreement has in fact recently been signed between our establishment and the Soviet Union to buy three airplanes of the TU 154 type, which we will receive at the end of the current year and the beginning of next year. These airplanes are very similar to the Boeing 747; they carry 145 passengers and are considered one of the most modern airplanes in the world. Our establishment has begun to prepare the necessary technical cadres, including pilots, co-pilots, aeronautical engineers, and technicians of all specialities. The first installment will be complete by the end of the current year. As for the second and third installments, they will be ready for operation in 1985. These airplanes will strengthen our air fleet in an outstanding manner. And we have since begun the necessary studies on opening new routes, the first of which is the Damascus-Aleppo-Frankfurt route. There are studies on opening up a new route from Aleppo to Athens, and from Athens to Madrid, and Damascus-Athens-Berlin-Stockholm, so that the Aleppo airport would become like the Damascus airport in relation to the airlines, and have connections to each of Rome, Munich, Frankfurt, Paris, and London.

In addition to all that, we intend to increase the number of flights on some of the active routes.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: There are always complaints that take-off times are not regular and are subject to change.

'Adnan al-Jabi: Regarding flight times, the necessary orders have been issued for the punctual take-off of airplanes from Damascus, and their arrival at other airports at the specified times. One can almost say that that has been achieved in 80 percent of all flights, but we must still double our efforts to make our flights 100 percent regular.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What about the competence of the work force in the establishment?

'Adnan al-Jabi: There is an annual training program which we have set up, taking into consideration raising the cultural, technical, and linguistic standards of all elements of the work force. This program is implemented annually through internal courses and outside courses, to be most complete. I believe that through this operation, the establishment will have raised its standards in all specialties, thus attaining very good standards.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What about the development of services for the airplanes?

'Adnan al-Jabi: The purchase of the mechanisms and equipment necessary for that has been assured, and the servicing of airplanes in the establishment has become very good. We have begun to furnish the airports of Aleppo and Latakia with the necessary installations and equipment.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What about ground operations and their organization?

'Adnan al-Jabi: Regarding ground operations, the necessary instructions have been given for organizing work in the administration, and regulating the arrival and departure of passengers at the scheduled times for each flight, and in a manner which assures the comfort of the citizen. Groud operations have been strengthened by six elements working to make flight times accurate in order to do away with any mistakes in reservations. And thank God, for the past seven months there have not been any complaints, and that is a clear indication of how well reservation operations are going.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What about the kitchen and catering service?

'Adnan al-Jabi: Instructions have been given to change all the old utensils and installations, which were replaced by new installations. We have concentrated on hygiene in general, and on the hygiene of those working in the service in particular. Also, the kitchen has been repainted, and the necessary improvements have been made in all fields, and the standard of the kitchen is presently very good. Soon we will proceed to set up a microbiology laboratory to analyze the meals and determine their hygiene level. Presently the kitchen has the capacity to produce 3000 meals a day. This could be doubled, to become 6000 meals a day. This kitchen can provide complete services to companies, and partial services to some other companies.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Does the company make agreements with tourist groups to provide flights and the like?

'Adnan al-Jabi: The present job of the establishment is only to transport tourist groups, and it has nothing to do with organizing trips or making agreements on the matter, since that is the domain of the Ministry of Tourism, which is giving the matter extremely good attention.

Finally, it must be said that these capabilities of ours, in spite of our determination to advance them further, express the bright side of Syria, since the wings of our airplanes bring to the entire world the advances in our experience, the earnestness of our efforts, the civilization of our people, an the heritage of our nation.

12547
CSO: 4404/563

SYRIA

BRIEFS

LOW-PRICED OIL FOR SYRIA--A trade agreement was recently signed in Tehran between Syria and Iran, by which Syria will obtain 7 million tons of crude oil at the reduced price of \$25 per barrel, in addition to another 1 million tons of oil that Syria will get gratis. Syria's share of oil is one of the terms of the trade agreement between the two countries, which includes several other commodities. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 64, 30 Jun 84 p 60] 7005

DEFENSE FIRST IN BUDGET--The defense budget occupied first place once again in the new Syrian budget, with 58 percent of the total current expenditures. The Ministry of Defense has been allocated 12.2 billion Syrian pounds (\$3 billion), while the total current expenditures is 22 billion pounds. This year's budget is 6 percent more than last year's budget, and is characterized by a reduction in the value of administrative costs. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 65, 7 Jul 84 p 60] 7005

CSO: 4404/562

MINISTER OUTLINES PLANS TO COMBAT FALL IN REMITTANCES

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 84 pp 1, 4

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Aug 9: Dr Mahbubul Haq, Federal Minister for Planning and Development, said here on Thursday that policy implications of the unexpected developments arising from falling foreign remittances and rising number of overseas workers returning home in relation to the export income and employment during the Sixth Plan period required to be seriously analysed in order to meet the unanticipated situation.

Speaking at a Press conference, the Planning Minister expressed his deep concern over the rising trend of workers returning home on termination of their overseas jobs, mainly from the Gulf. He admitted that the developments in relation to the decline in foreign remittances and overseas jobs had not been accurately anticipated while formulating the Sixth Plan.

There are an estimated two million Pakistanis employed in the Middle east.

He said that as against the peak reached in foreign remittances at the beginning of the '80s, registering a 30 per cent rise in a single year, the Sixth Plan visualised an average rise of 10 per cent a year. However, the latest figures for 1983-84 showed a 4 per cent decline in remittances for the first time in a decade.

Similarly, Dr Haq said, although in coming years the outflow of Pakistani job seekers abroad would be more than the inflow of those returning home, it would be much less than anticipated and far below the average during the last decade. He quoted from several qualified studies, including one conducted by the ILO, which estimated that as against an outflow of 850,000 Pakistanis seeking overseas jobs, 600,000 would be returning home during the Sixth Plan period.

Such a large influx of unemp-

loyed Pakistanis from overseas, he said, would confront the Government with a serious employment problem which would mean provision of at least 15 per cent more jobs than stipulated in the Sixth Plan. Besides, the influx of unemployed overseas workers would impose a heavier burden on services in the country.

The Planning Minister said that one possible way of overcoming the problems posed by falling foreign remittances was to increase export earnings. But he recognised that was a challenging job.

He said that expansion in small industrial units could be one way of absorbing the rising number of unemployed, pointing out that there had been a rapid growth in small industry in Pakistan, with 80,000 units in urban areas and 30,000 units in rural areas.

Dr Haq admitted, however, that the unanticipated and unwelcome developments in the area of overseas employment and foreign remittances required to be studied carefully, and a national debate on the issue with a view to finding a solution would be quite in order. In order to highlight the importance of foreign remittances, he said, that during the Fifth Plan period they totalled a little under \$13 billion, and overseas employment took care of one-third of job seekers in the country.

The Planning Minister also expressed his concern over the decline in remittances through formal banking, and said that apparently the 'Hundi' business, which employed tape-recording, had taken away a large slice of banking transactions by providing a speedy door-to-door service to those remitting money home. He suggested that private competition in banking was necessary to ginger up State-owned banking.

FORMER MINISTER SAYS INDIA MAY DISRUPT PAKISTANI ELECTIONS

Karachi DAWN in English 12 Aug 84 p 10

[Text]

RAWALPINDI, Aug 11: Former Petroleum Minister (retd) Maj-Gen Rao Farman Ali Khan said here on Saturday that India might disrupt Pakistan's general election schedule by creating a difficult situation for the country.

He pleaded for restoration of democracy in the country to foil India's nefarious designs.

Rao Farman Ali, who was speaking at a function in a local hotel, sounded a note of warning that the country's undemocratic set-up might invite Indian aggression.

The former Minister said India had attacked former East Pakistan because people there were forced to live in a set-up contrary to their wishes.

He said if India attacked, no Superpower would come to Pakistan's rescue.

He denied that Pakistan's defeat in 1971 was the worst of its kind, and added that nations, fighting internal and external enemies side by side, had met a similar fate in the past.

He also denied that the number of soldiers who surrendered in the 1971 war was 90,000. The number, he said, was many times less than what was frequently published. The 90,000 also included a pretty large number of women and children, he added.

CSO: 4600/710

PUNJAB GOVERNMENT COMPILING DISTRICT GAZETTEERS

Karachi DAWN in English 11 Aug 84 p 5

[Text]

LAHORE, Aug 10: The Punjab published by the Board of Revenue Government is undertaking a comprehensive exercise of compiling Khushab, Okara, Layyah, Lahore, and publishing up-to-date district Jhelum, Rahimyar Khan. gazetteers covering all aspects of life of each district of the province, only maps, charts and graphs. For it was learnt here.

The Board of Revenue has completed the publication of gazetteers of seven out of 27 districts of the province while four gazetteers about Muzaffargarh, Sargodha, D.G. Khan and Sahiwal are under print and the rest are being revised.

The last gazetteer was published about Gujranwala District in July 1935 while the first gazetteer in Punjab was about Dera Ghazi Khan which came out in 1883.

The seven up-to-date gazetteers

are about the districts of Rajanpur, Khushab, Okara, Layyah, Lahore, and publishing up-to-date district Jhelum, Rahimyar Khan. The old gazetteers contained only maps, charts and graphs. For the first time coloured and black

and white photographs have been added in the newly published gazetteers in which ideological aspect of Pakistan has also been covered.

The Board of Revenue has started the new gazetteers from the dates the gazetteers were last printed.

The Board has also reprinted the old gazetteers published between 1883 to 1935 which had become rare.

CSO: 4600/710

ELECTIONS: PERSPECTIVE, REGIME'S STRATEGY ANALYZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5, 6 Aug 84

[2-part series by Dr Mohammad Waseem: "Towards Elections"]

[5 Aug 84 p 4]

[Text] President Zia's recent assurance about holding general elections in the country in accordance with his August 12 formula has led to speculation about the nature and direction of mass mobilisation in such an event. In his address to the 10th session of the Majlis-e-Shoora, the President referred to a rule by shooracracy after the elections. However, politically minded people are in general more interested in the prospects of holding power in the future. Issues like the election's date, its party or non-party basis and the time allowed for campaigning have gradually engaged public attention. It seems the last quarter of this year and the first quarter of the next year will be decisive in shaping the contours of our political system within a post-martial law framework.

While a political process of some sort can therefore be expected to start sooner or later, the political parties are still keeping their fingers crossed, wondering what lies in store for them. Indeed, the question of parties' participation in the forthcoming elections is the most significant feature of the pre-election phase of politics in Pakistan. Lately, the government

has been relatively calm about this issue, but all indicators point to the barring of parties from the elections. What will be the shape of an election campaign in such an event? It is obvious that a partyless election would limit the scope of canvassing - territorially, organisationally and ideologically. For example, no links would be sought between candidates from different constituencies throughout Pakistan, even though they belong to the same party. Similarly, political leaders belonging to various parties would not be required to track from one constituency to another in favour of their partymates, thus nullifying the role of parties as symbols of organised public opinion. All this would mean a death knell for organisational activity.

UNACCEPTABLE

And yet the political parties of Pakistan have been operating for too long to accept this situation lying down. They have both formal and informal links with various non-political institutions and groups, such as trade unions, student organisations and religious institutions. Through these forums of organised public activity, parties can effectively change the course of elections in at least a selected number of constituencies. At some places, they can even provide financial leverage to candidates of their own choice, to whom they would be openly or secretly obliged. Moreover, a very large number of political workers are still available to these parties,

whom the leaders can mobilize for effective campaigning wherever need be. It can be surmised, therefore, that parties' role in a partyless election will be neither totally irrelevant nor fully decisive, the reason being a lack of organised power. For example, an operational gulf exists between party leaders and cadres due to a seven year period of martial law. Also, the few leaders of a national standing are virtually partyless in the sense that their parties are merely small networks of inherited followers, which cannot provide them a mass base. On the other hand, the one or two strong parties lack leaders of a national status within the country. Such anomalies may tend to facilitate the localisation of politics, as the present government probably desires.

If parties are thus rendered irrelevant, does it mean that the proposed election would be only a display of strength by powerful individuals? In other words, would it be an election without issues? Most probably, the answer would be in the affirmative. As the media would be rendered useless for individual contestants and party intellectuals would be immobilized due to the potential estrangement of cities from the countryside, ideological issues would be increasingly robbed of their significance. The ideological parties are likely to suffer most in such a situation. In fact, instead of left or right, the election might revolve around the issue of pro and anti Zia political affiliations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the most notable feature of the election would be the past commitments of candidates, i.e. their pro or anti establishment credentials, instead of future programmes and manifestos, which are redundant anyway in a partyless election. It is likely that most candidates would belong to the older rather than the younger generation, since the former has the necessary wherewithal for contesting an election on traditional lines, such as financial power and networks of contacts in the locality. After all, this type of power game needs a political acumen rooted in crude opportunism of the old ward rather than the ideological simplicity of youth. The election would thus in all probability legitimize the present status quo by other means.

In the absence of a role for parties and ideological issues, perhaps the whole exercise would focus on the election of notables for representing the general masses in the corridors of power. A host of such "notables" have taken refuge under the umbrella of the Majlis-e-Shoora, established by the

present regime. A majority of them would perhaps take part in the elections, as has been suggested in government and non-government quarter. They would take a relatively clear stand on such issues as local development and Islamisation and would thus defend the present government's policies as well as their own affiliations with it. Their role is similar to other episodes in our brief history. Iskander Mirza's sponsorship of the Republican Party in the mid-50's and Ayub Khan's patronage of the Muslim League in the mid-60's. Both these parties comprised the breakaway factions of the original Muslim League, and some of them acted as 'the king's party' in the parliament. It seems another 'king's party' is in the making, consisting of the more ambitious members of the Majlis-e-Shoora, all of whom were hand picked by President Zia. His government has not bothered to maintain a neutral stance vis-a-vis the elections. In fact, it has shown clear preference for current Shoora members in their election contest. It can be expected that opposition forces would accuse the government of giving financial and administrative help to these members. The government would perhaps equally forcefully deny such charges. But then, what stakes do Shoora members have in continued loyalty to the incumbent government. If things do not take the turn which the government wants, given the fact that there is always some unpredictability in elections, then it might be the end of many Shoora members political careers. As for the campaign itself, these members would expect decisive government support in the form of pressure from the local bureaucracy, moral support from the media and allowance for making underhanded dealings with potential voter blocs. On the other hand, for the government it is a matter of keeping its credibility in the public eye at home and in international diplomatic circles. It therefore cannot afford to try to get people of its own choice elected, and even less to eliminate certain categories of people from the contest altogether, because that would reduce elections to a virtual selection, as is feared by many.

MATTER OF CHOICE

What other choices does the government have for achieving "positive results"? One possible choice is indicated by the oft-repeated stress on a short election campaign. What does the government expect from a comparatively shorter period for

canvassing for the election? It seems the government has paid to much attention to the "lesson" of the 1970 elections, which showed that a long election campaign tends to mobilize hitherto inactive groups and classes, which then pressure the state to open its doors to them. In other words, a short election campaign is considered a bulwark against a general politicisation of social forces, thus keeping the exclusivity of the ruling elites intact. It thereby promises to go against the so-called radical parties.

It is also maintained that a short campaign would not allow enough time for the major political parties to organise and influence the course of elections. Both of these observations however, may not reflect the underlying truth or the present political situation. For example, it is fairly well known that one political party enjoys the support of a silent majority, which may not take out demonstrations in the streets in its favour but which would passively vote for its candidates. It would then be the so-called conservatives who need time to lure the people away from certain party lines, and in so doing localize the issues. A strong case should therefore be made for rising above such narrow considerations of expediency in the interest of restoring the health of our body politic by showing readiness to accept the verdict of the people. For that purpose, a free exchange of opinion should take place via the media and other channels of public expression for a reasonable length of time prior to elections.

The same can be said about the amendments to the 1973 Constitution. Any arbitrary measures in this regard would simply align the articulate section of the population in Pakistan. One proposed amendment would shift some powers of the prime minister to the president. That would make a presidential election worth its while and lend meaning to the recent proposal of Talpur about holding presidential elections before parliamentary elections. Perhaps the official mind is currently in favour of first getting the incumbent president elected, which would then command the direction of parliamentary elections in his favour. Perhaps the model for this type of electoral schedule is derived from Ayub Khan's election as president in 1965 under the 1962 Constitution, which was followed by a landslide victory for him in the national and provincial assemblies. However, there are some important differences in the two situations. Unlike Ayub Khan's

case, the present government will have to introduce drastic amendments to the 1973 Constitution to hold presidential elections independent of, and prior to, the parliamentary elections, and also to make these elections worth the whole exercise. Such a course of action has the potential of creating a constitutional crisis. Even at the practical level, a president in a parliamentary system, as opposed to the presidential system, is unlikely to wield enough power to influence the results of parliamentary elections by the sheer force of his own victory.

SITUATION

Such a situation can, however, become a reality if two complementary changes are brought about in the 1973 Constitutional framework, i.e. the enhancement of the president's powers and the reduction of the parliament to a mere advisory body. That would change Pakistan's state system back to the presidential one, at least in spirit if not in letter. Can such an arrangement produce a political atmosphere amenable to a lasting solution to the present crisis in the country? All indications are that this is not possible. Public opinion of all shades in all the four provinces of Pakistan has rejected the presidential system in categorical terms. Therefore, it can be assumed that the present government would not take such drastic measures at this delicate moment. That fact should also render the talk of holding presidential elections prior to parliamentary elections redundant and self-defeating. It is hoped that the future parliament will be a sovereign body, not subject to any institution or individual. Only then can the talk of restoration of democracy in Pakistan be taken seriously and the country's federal structure be saved from total collapse.

BEHAVIOUR

In fact, the way the provinces behave in the coming elections would determine the level of national integration as manifested by the division of powers between the centre and provinces on the one hand and by the representation of the local population in the provincial governments, especially in Sind and Baluchistan, on the

other. To say the least the election results in these two provinces would be unpredictable and thus very significant politically. The political unrest in rural Sind and its current expression in the form of a disturbed law-and-order situation point to an election campaign which will be accompanied by violence. On the other hand, the more a political solution to the current lawlessness in Sind is delayed, the greater will be the loss to the cause of national unity and to the federal character of our polity. In Baluchistan, the new generation of Baluch intelligentsia is bracing itself for a leadership role in the coming elections. The leadership patterns in the other two provinces may not be so unpredictable, if only because their political atmosphere is less charged and their new leaderships are not yet in sight.

At the end, we can ask the million dollar question: Are elections going to be held? The reason for posing this question at the end, and not at the beginning, of our observations on the likely pattern of electoral mobilisation is that non-government forums of public opinion in Pakistan cynically tend to brush aside all official announcements about elections as mere propaganda, a habit which must be avoided in order to analyze the situation dispassionately. It is true that the present government suffers from a huge credibility gap on the issue of elections, because it twice announced and then postponed them. But it is also true that the past seven years of martial law have failed to eliminate a mass demand for the restoration of parliamentary democracy through general elections. Its latest manifesto was the MRD agitation in 1983, in at least the two provinces of Sind and Punjab. The government duly obliged by sponsoring an election formula on August 12, 1983 mainly as a response to the MRD's call for a movement from August 14. It is almost certain that another movement of at least the same intensity will be launched by the democratic forces of the country if the present election schedule is postponed once again. The government is acutely conscious that the apparent calm in the political realm must not be disturbed by arbitrarily changing its own election schedule. Also there are fears that it may not survive another jolt to its credibility by postponing elections once again or by robbing them of an acceptable level of legitimacy.

[Text]

Those who tend to downgrade such positive considerations point to President Zia's agile personality, which allegedly seeks ways and means of self-perpetuation in power. What are the President's options in this regard? If we dwell on foreign factors, the obvious reference will be to India's bellicosity, which would provide an alibi to postpone elections.

But to what extent can the Pakistan government afford to assume a hostile posture towards India and provoke counter hostility from it considering the past 'wars with that country'. Only a very reckless government would embark on such an adventurist policy, and the present regime seems to be far too conservative to follow this policy. It has also shown great restraint in its Afghanistan policy, and it is unlikely that its passive posture in favour of a 'status quo' on our northern borders will take a radical turn towards hostility. All this means that the government's option to play its card of hostile neighbours is very limited. But what about internal factors? For example, the government may choose to play up acts of violence perpetrated on civil property and human life, before or after the start of election campaign. Or it may crack down on some politically active groups or parties, which may lead to a civil disobedience movement, which in turn may confuse the whole election schedule. Or, finally, its election formula might contain features which are absolutely unacceptable to the majority of the political community in the country, leading to a boycott of elections and subsequently to their postponement. These options are, obviously, contingent upon various other factors, such as the economic situation, the limits imposed on political operation of certain political leaders and parties and the re-alignment of political forces in the country. The only thing which is sure is that the political system of Pakistan is at a juncture where a change in its formal structure is imminent.

Till now we have considered the possible shape of the electoral campaign as well as the factors threatening a postponement of elections. But what if the government actually succeeds in postponing elections without any immediate threat from the political opposition? In other words, what will be the shape of politics in 1985-

86, if the present set-up continues? It seems the greatest challenge will come from the now imminent economic crisis if large numbers of emigrant labourers return from the Gulf especially towards the second half of 1985. Various socio-economic anomalies would tend to disrupt the social order, such as the returnees search for jobs, better accommodation, schooling for their children, accelerated rural to urban migration, new inter-class and inter-regional inequalities, and a widespread sense of frustration because of the absence of channels for articulating these problems. All this would lead to radicalisation of political issues far exceeding that in the late 1960's at the end of Ayub Khan's decade of development. In other words, the broad political situation is based on an expanding economy, which was largely responsible for the present regime's relatively smooth governing for many years, and it will take a downward turn in the months and years to come. It would mean that an election in late 1985 or early 1986 would be far more devastating for the establishment than one in late 1984 or early 1985.

To sum up, we can reiterate that apparently the present government seems to have decided to go ahead with elections of some sort. The scope of constitutional amendments in this regard will be largely determined by its confidence in its ability to suppress the political opposition. In the absence of political parties, perhaps the elections will revert to the classical model of factional conflict in a localised universe. Political elements will carry weight in selected constituencies, while the majority of the contestants will try to mobilize caste and tribal links in their favour. The local bureaucracy might turn out to be decisive in certain areas, especially if the government chooses to back the Majlis-e-Shoora members in their election contests. If, however, the election does not proceed according to the schedule of August 12, a grave political crisis might engulf the country, because it would provide a new lease on life to dormant political forces in the form of a sacred cause to fight for. The same might happen if the election approximates selection in some fundamental sense. Finally, the economic crisis looming large on the horizon might lead the government to hold elections sooner rather than later for the fear of radicalisation of politics. At any rate, we are in for some interesting changes in our body politic.

REGIME SAID POISED FOR ELECTIONS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Jul 84 p 9

[Article by Ayaz Amir: "The Art of the Possible"]

[Text]

IF ONE FINE MORNING Gen. Ziaul Haq springs a surprise and announces elections, how are the defunct political elements going to react? As we race towards autumn and another Independence Day, this question assumes more and more importance.

At the moment, it is true, it would require a clairvoyant with extraordinary powers to read Gen. Zia's mind. But while it is difficult to say anything definitive, the importance of several steps he has taken this year should not be overlooked. These include:

- The changes in the Army command which have strengthened his hands.
- The departure from the country of Benazir Bhutto which has meant the removal of a major irritant from the domestic scene.
- The ban on the student unions which has cut the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami down to size.
- The ban on political reporting which is keeping the atmosphere pollution-free.

While not amounting to an irreversible slide in the direction of elections, these steps indicate that the regime has positioned itself to be ready for elections if and when they are held.

Are they ready?

Are the defunct political elements displaying a similar readiness? Have they even sorted out the academic question of whether they will partici-

pate in any future elections which, considering Gen. Zia's limitations, are bound to be controlled and restricted? Do they think Gen. Zia will give them enough time to get their thinking straight once the trap is sprung? The answer to all these questions is 'no'.

It is a well-founded suspicion that after Gen. Zia put a stop to their bara khamas and took them out of the newspapers, the political elements have gone into hiding. They are only likely to wake up and react once the regime has made the next move.

The situation is not helped by the fact that some of these political elements are predisposed to boycott any polls which fall short of the puristic standards of the 1973 Constitution. A powerful factor taking them in this direction is the knowledge that whatever the form of elections their electoral chances would remain dim. If these elements have their way, they would be committing a serious mistake.

There can be no hard and fast rules about a parliamentary or electoral boycott. Its usefulness has to be judged from the standpoint of objective circumstances. If political conditions are favourable, that is to say, if they are red hot, if political organisations are in tune with the mood and the wishes of the masses, and the masses are willing to heed their beck and call, then a boycott is not only useful, it is downright necessary. But if political conditions are regressive, political organisations confused

and on the retreat, and the masses inert and apathetic, a boycott would be positively harmful for it would mean that the political elements have vacated an arena which, with some skill and courage, they could have turned to their advantage.

The choice

In such circumstances, a rigid interpretation of what is principle and what is not, is of little help. As a matter of principle, can there be any doubt that partyless elections militate against the spirit of democracy and the 1973 Constitution? Yet at a time when the regime is well-entrenched and the political elements are in profound disarray, is there any use in working this argument to death while not being able to do anything more about it? If the choice is between electoral participation and a democratic struggle, then surely electoral participation amounts to political treachery. But when such a choice does not exist, a boycott would be nothing more than idle posturing. Politics being primarily the art of the possible, political organisations are under obligation to set aims and objectives which are in accord with

their strengths and their capabilities.

Prequalification

With the stress on the prequalification of candidates, the deputy commissioners will no doubt be able to proscribe known Leftists or other candidates with known hardline views; but unless the elections are to be reduced to a total farce, some 'popular' candidates will inevitably slip through. If the regime chooses to treat the elections as a pantomime, the political elements have nothing to fear. The onus of the boycott in that case will not be on their shoulders.

The argument that participation in a reactionary shoora or parliament will corrupt party members is only partially true. If members prove vacillating, that is a reflection on the organisations to which they belong to. Even the Bolsheviks, it should be remembered, whom no one will accuse of ideological flabbiness, participated in several of the pre-revolutionary Tsarist Dumas. None of their members went astray. All the more reason for political organisations concerned to set their houses in order. Otherwise they will miss the bus when the gong is sounded.

CSO: 4600/711

PERSPECTIVE ON EDUCATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7, 8 Aug 84

[7 Aug 84 p 4]

[Part 1 of series "Education in Pakistan: A Perspective" by Salim Mehmud:
"Low Priority for Governments"]

[Text]

How is the educational standard of a society or a nation judged? The percentage of literacy would be a reasonable standard but then definition of literacy has to be carefully established. In Pakistan for example all those persons who have the ability to read a newspaper and write a letter are classified as literates. This by no means is a satisfactory definition to be taken to determine the literacy rate of a society. However, even when such a relaxed definition of literacy is applied as a standard, those who can be classified in this category constitute such a small percentage of "literate persons" in Pakistan that the whole picture looks very grim. According to 1981 census results reported in a latest publication of the Census Commission, the literacy percentage is 26.5% which has 35.05% share of males and 15.9% share of females.

The disparity in literacy rate between the population of urban and rural areas is quite gross. The over all literacy rate for the urban areas is 47.12% as against only 17.33% for the rural areas. Women folk are worst off. Their literacy rate in the urban areas is 37% and

in the villages a mere 5%. The literacy rate for women in rural areas of Sind is as small as 3.5% which perhaps would be the lowest in the world. Out of 13 million persons who had undergone some form of education, 46% had passed primary schools, 23% middle schools and 20% high schools. The percentage abruptly drops down to 5.9% for those passing from intermediate colleges, 3.8% for those obtaining bachelors degree and only 1% for those who have the good fortune of being able to acquire master's degree. The percentage of persons obtaining professional degrees is infinitesimally small. It is 0.28% for engineering graduates, 0.25% for medical graduates and 0.28% for law graduates. It would also be interesting to know that out of the over all percentage of men and women at different levels of educational institutions, the women's share for primary, middle school and matric levels was only 30.7%, 24.6% and 23.5% respectively. As for medical education this percentage was 22.3% and for law an insignificant percentage of 3.1%. If the entire population of 88 million was considered, only 8% would have successfully passed through primary education, 2.8% secondary education, 0.3% college education and 0.06% university education. The highest literacy percentage is in Sind with a figure of 31.45% followed by Punjab with 27.42%, NWFP 16.70%, Baluchistan 10.32%, FATA 6.38% and Islamabad 51.57%.

During the entire period of 37 years since the birth of Pakistan,

the literacy rate has only marginally increased from 12% in 1947 to 26.5% in 1981. In the decade since 1971 to 1981, the growth has been only 5% that is from 21.7% to 26.5% showing an extremely small annual growth rate of half a percent. The fact of the matter is that we are losing ground with time. The literacy rate has declined in the rural areas from 27.5% in 1972 to only 17.3% in 1981 in the case of male population and from 7% to 5% in the case of female population. The total enrolment in primary education schools has fallen from 54% in 1977-78 to 50% in 1982 of primary school going age children.

The education sector in Pakistan has been totally ignored in the past which has led to the present hopeless situation. Even by the measure of developing countries Pakistan spends an extremely small percentage of its gross national product on education. Not only this, the small percentage is also sliding down with time. The expenditure on education as percentage of GNP in 1972-73 was 2.1%, in 1977-78 1.8% and in 1982 only 1.5%. In the Sixth Five Year Plan this percentage is expected to rise to 1.9%. However, many developing countries spend as much as 5% of their GNP on education. Total neglect of education in Pakistan has led the country to a situation where its literacy rate is lowest amongst the third world countries. As an example Sri Lanka has literacy rate of 85%, while in India the percentage is 40%. Even Bangla Desh has higher rate of literacy than Pakistan. The literacy rate in other South East Asian countries is growing very rapidly. Sri Lanka despite scarcity of resources is moving ahead to reach 97% of literacy rate.

At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan had only two universities. The number of universities has now risen to 19 out of which 10 are general purpose universities and 7 are professional. The 7 professional universities comprise 4 engineering universities and

3 agriculture universities. Two universities have special character, one being Allama Iqbal Open University and the other reserved for Islamic studies. The enrolment in the universities has increased from 5084 in 1960-61 to 56,705 in 1981-82, which shows an increase by a factor of 11 in a period of two decades. Enrolment in the general arts and science colleges has registered an increase from 71,000 in 1960-61 to 245,000 in 1981-82. These increases should however not lead to any complacency because the "inflated" numbers are basically on account of increase in the population and some improvement in the percentage of those going in for higher education. The output of science graduates has registered a steep downward trend as can be seen from the following figures: 13,955 in 1975 to 7,598 in 1980 representing a percentage decrease of about 45% in professional graduates and master's degree holders in all sciences over the last 5 years. If one was to study the isolated effect of reduction of number of graduates specialising in basic sciences, the percentage decrease will be much more than 45%. The reason being that over the same period those graduating in medical and engineering professions have been showing a steady increase. As for the law graduates their number has risen four-folds during the same period of five years that is 1975-81.

Those graduating from vocational training institutes and poly-technic institutes are in gross minority. According to an estimate, two million workers are working abroad whose departure from Pakistan has created a serious shortage of trained manpower within the country. At present, the annual turn out of the skilled manpower is only 50,000 in which total the contribution of officially established institutions is a small number of 13,500. If the continued exodus of skilled workers to foreign countries is accounted for, there would be need to train at least 100,000 professional persons each year.

[8 Aug 84 pp 4, 5]

[Part 2 of series "Education in Pakistan: A Perspective" by Salim Mehmud: "Eliminating Illiteracy"]

[Text]

The impact of overall poor literacy rate and almost total abandonment of scientific fields on the R&D organiza-

tions, universities, industry and other sectors of economy has been devastating. Although there has been a proliferation

of scientific and technical institutions in Pakistan: their number increased from 73 in 1974 to 137 in the year 1982, there has been no matching improvement in the funds allocated to these institutions nor in their ability to recruit quality manpower for R&D work. The increase in the scientific and technical institutions amounts to about 88% over the last five years period whereas the availability of Ph.D. manpower has only increased by 30%. According to an estimate the number of Ph.D's in the field of all sciences is of the order of 900, out of which 600 are employed in the universities compared to 300 in the S&T establishments. To show the glaring concentration of these Ph.D's in a few universities and R&D organisations, it would be appropriate to cite the example that out of 137 S&T institutions, 119 of these institutions have less than 4 Ph.D's. Similarly, the Ph.D's in universities are concentrated in only 3-4 universities. The total budget of S&T establishments is estimated at US \$ 72 million which is far from being adequate. But things are even more disparate when one considers R&D budget of 19 universities which is less than 5% of that total. The position of Physics teachers is even more serious. In all the universities of Pakistan, there are no more than 120 teachers out of which only 53 hold Ph.D. degrees. Again these Ph.D. degree holders in Physics are concentrated in 3 or 4 universities alone.

The analysis of the factual picture of education base obtaining in Pakistan leads one to readily conclude that there is urgent need for paying maximum attention to the single most important sector namely, Education which is so vital for well-being and survival of the nation. The position is so bad that even the very thought of it is likely to make a weak-nerved administrator faint. The question arises as to which should be the level and area of educational sector that should be accorded the higher priority? Is it the primary

level or matriculation level or higher or university level or should we concentrate on improving the standard of professional institutions or should there be more focus on science education and improvement of R&D activity at the universities and so on? In spite of the fact that Pakistan obviously has limited resources by way of finances and adequately trained personnel, it is still mandatory that improvements should take place on a very broad front. These must cover all the above levels plus several more. Then there is urgent need to revise the syllabus of all the courses particularly of science and technology to make these more in line with the demands of our nation and also of the modern times. Obviously the starting point has to be the primary level. There are about 62,500 primary schools, 442 colleges and 19 universities in the country. Out of these primary schools, there are only 20,000 schools for girls and 132 colleges exclusively for women. This disparity is glaring when one considers the fact that female population is 52% of the population of Pakistan. Full 45% of the primary schools established during the Fifth Five Year Plan are mosque schools. By the end of March 1983, a total number of 11,751 mosque schools had become operational in four provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.

EXPENDITURE

Rupees 6,000 crores are earmarked for spending by the federal and provincial governments on education during the Sixth Five Year Plan. Rs.2,000 crores from this total are reserved for comprehensive development of education at all levels and Rs.4,000 crores will go for meeting the recurring expenditure. The expenditure on primary education will be Rs. 700 crores as against Rs.140 crores during the previous Plan. The primary education enrolment is expected to increase to 5.5 million children as compared with new enrolment of 1.3 million during the last Plan period. The number of mosque schools is expected to increase to 40,000 and the formal primary education schools will increase to 85,000. Half of the total of Rs. 700 crores expenditure proposed to be incurred on primary education will be allocated to the provinces and distributed as follows: Punjab Rs.132 crores, Sind Rs.77 crores, NWFP Rs.74 crores, Baluchistan Rs.19 crores and FATA Rs.15 crores. The spending on secondary education programme is expected to increase two-folds from Rs.190 crores in the

Fifth Five Year Plan to Rs.412 crores in the current Plan. The target is to achieve enrolment at this level of education of at least one million students. The output of vocational and technical training institutions is proposed to be doubled from 10,000 in 1982 to 20,000 in 1987-88. The annual output of polytechnic graduates is targeted to be raised to 5,000 from 3,500 by the same period. A special university in the private sector for conducting R&D and teaching in advanced science and technology at post-graduate level is also expected to be established to fill the very serious gap between the educational standard obtaining in the present universities of Pakistan and those of the developed countries.

About 7,000 literacy centres will be opened in the next four years to boost the literacy rate from 26.5% to 40%. These literacy centres will be designed to educate 20 million adults and will employ the mode of television for instructional purposes. While setting up these centres, it should be borne in mind that their maximum concentration should be in rural areas which support some 70% of the total population. Out of this, 20% of the rural population is concentrated in settlements of less than 300 persons. It would, therefore, be necessary to set up at least one community education centre in each of these settlements, which would conveniently run into hundred thousands or more. To undertake such a massive education programme would need the support of equally large number of teachers. Presently it is rather ironic that even the existing teachers training institutions are operating at 20-30% of their full capacity. Not only that all efforts

will have to be made to recruit more teachers through giving them necessary incentives for making up full use of existing teachers training institutes but more such institutes will have to be established in the Sixth Five Year Plan and beyond. Particular attention should also be given to remove the gross disparity between the male and female literacy percentage. This would need opening of more schools and colleges for females. If this is not done, the plan to eradicate illiteracy cannot succeed. In fact females should be accorded higher priority in literacy programmes because of their profound influence on the offspring.

There is also need for large scale training of manpower particularly in scientific and technical fields, both within the country and abroad to make up for the past deficiencies in a reasonable scale of time. In this context, China could be a good example which sent 10,000 students in 1982 and 3,000 in 1983 to the United States alone for higher education especially in science and technology. In all, a massive effort is, therefore, required to educate the teeming millions of Pakistan for the very survival of the country. Could there be any more priority area than working for safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of the nation? The answer is clear to every one. There is thus need to pool up all the national resources to attack the number one priority problem and wip out the scourge of illiteracy from Pakistan in the next 10 years. There is no doubt that with determined will and implementation of right programmes with high priority such seemingly difficult goal could surely be realised.

CSO: 4600/713

OMBUDSMAN TALKS ABOUT FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 Aug 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Nusrat Javeed]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Aug. 8: Sardar Mohammad Iqbal, Wafaqi Mohtasib (The Ombudsman) has said that his office had dealt with 32,455 cases during its first year of establishment. Out of these complaints received at the office, 16,421 were found beyond his jurisdiction, 12,095 applications were disposed of while 2000 people were provided with relief.

The moment, 3939 cases were pending before him. The Ombudsman was talking to 'The Muslim' on the first anniversary of his assumption of office as Wafaqi Mohtasib.

He said that while establishing the office, it was estimated that an average of 10,000 complaints would be dealt with every year. The record number of complaints were mainly due to the ignorance of the general public which could not fully appreciate the jurisdiction limits of his office. The delaying tactics of the bureaucracy was another factor.

He regretted that the bureaucrats were inaccessible to the public, "unfortunately", he said, "our public servants have made themselves prisoners of the secretariat. They have become totally alienated from actual problems of an average citizen". There could be few problems, if the senior officials personally hear the people.

He said that accessibility of the senior government officials was an indirect assurance for quick disposal of cases as the juniors would realise that their delaying tactics would not remain hidden from their officers. Another factor causing problems for the people was the inability of the public servants to

take initiatives. "Purges in the past by various governments have created a strong sense of insecurity among the public servants who avoid taking decisions and thus sticking their necks out", he said.

He refuted the opinion that a huge budget was consumed by his office. "Those calling us a white elephant", he said, 'do not know that a budget of Rs.3.5 crore was approved for us for the first year. We have only consumed one crore 5 lakh rupees and Rs.2 crore have been returned to the Government. This year when four provincial offices are to be established and research cells set up, only 2 crore rupees have been demanded from the Government".

He also disclosed that the Government while planning this office thought that 102 officers of the rank of deputy secretary and above would be required for proper functioning. However, the office was excellently functioning with only 27 officers. "Around one-fifth of the staff allocated for the Ombudsman's secretariat dealt with complaints which were three times more than the applications conceived while establishing the office", he said.

He said that there were people who cynically say that the office was good for only correcting telephone and electricity bills. "Those who do not earn from smuggling or other illegal and immoral sources can not appreciate the agony of those who are made victims of inflated bills", he said. However, he claimed that reliefs reaching millions were granted through the efforts of his office.

He said that people cracked jokes when he asked the WAPDA to give round figures to its consumers

He informed that in the past if the bill was say, for 19.39 or Rs. 19.78 the WAPDA used to charge Rs.20 from its consumers. "I asked them that if the figure after the digit should be less than 50, the consumer would only pay the lesser amount in round figures. Would you believe it that after my decision, a meeting of WAPDA authorities went on for eleven hours. They found that after this decision, their organisation would earn Rs.10 million less than the normal profit."

He referred to various cases where not only an individual but a definite section of the general public earned benefits touching millions after his intervention.

He revealed that various studies were conducted by his office on how to streamline procedures and rules of different departments dealing with the public. One study was made on the question of requisitioning and dehiring houses for government servants i.e. another dealt with the functioning of the House Building Finance Corporation, while a third was evaluating the secretarial rules in view of delayed decisions. Soon, he said, the recommendations of his office would be presented before the President for possible implementation.

The Ombudsman opined that the media could not project his office in a proper manner. "I do not have any power. I could only recommend. But, if the media projects my recommendations, the agencies would be pressurised to implement them by the force of public opinion. Everywhere in the world, the Ombudsman seeks his power from public opinion, he said.

He claimed that Pakistan was the only country in the Third World where office of the Ombudsman was working in any worthwhile manner. He believed that after his success in Pakistan, the Indian government was also thinking of establishing such an office. "They have taken keen notes of our performance, procedure and

methods", he said.

Explaining his method of dealing with the applications, he said that his organisation was an "office of today" where things coming in were to be answered back on the same day. "In one year we have spent Rs.64,380 on postage, establishing extensive communications". He said that he and his staff would not leave their office unless all cases coming on a single day are not categorised and assessed on the same day. He disagreed with the idea that rate of the application not found fit for hearing was too high. Not more than ten per cent of the petitions filed before the Supreme Court are heard, he claimed. Rest of the applications were disposed of summarily as they usually are not in accordance with the law. He said that expanding the current jurisdiction of his office would prove to be counter-productive. He was particularly reluctant in acquiring jurisdiction over service matters. "There are more than 700,000 serving the Government. Dealing with their grievances would create tremendous strains and problems".

He regretted that people said that the Wafaqi Mohtasib could not weed out corruption in the country. He said that he was ready to cooperate with anybody who would like him to take action against public servants taking bribes. "Please try to understand, those who after greasing someone's palm save or make millions of rupees are not going to come to me against corruption in certain departments".

After dealing with general grievances for more than a year, he came to the conclusion that the most important problem was frauds in banking. Most of our rural people who depend on the money coming from the Middle East sent by their relatives do not understand the system of banking. It is easy to cheat them. There were various cases of fraud and parallel banking established by the banking staff. He, however, claimed that his keen interest in some of these cases had reduced the number of complaints.

CSO: 4600/713

ECONOMIST DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Shahid Javed Burki: "Pakistan: Contemporary Economic Issues: A Strategy for Agricultural Development"]

[Text]

Pakistan's ability to husband its vast agricultural potential will decisively influence the performance of its economy for at least the next decade and a half to the year 2000. The fulfillment of the Sixth Five Year Plan's modest growth target will also depend on agriculture's performance in the remaining four years of the plan period. A considerable amount of analytical work must be done before the position I will take here can be fully defended. That fact notwithstanding, it would be useful to set out briefly the reasons for holding it.

The importance of agriculture for Pakistan's economy should need little explaining. After all, it contributes 31 per cent to the gross domestic output, employs 53 per cent of the labour force, and is currently responsible for 85 per cent of merchandise exports. It is more important than all other sectors of the economy and is likely to remain so for at least another two decades. That emphasis should be placed on the development of agriculture should not come as startling news.

But what is less evident is the fact that the strategy that will extract the maximum from Pakistan's agricultural system is not the one that is being currently pursued. The Sixth Plan has made a beginning, but the planners have a long stretch to cover before they will arrive at the end I envision. -

Before outlining the strategy,

the two important premises on which it is based should be stated. The first is that the cropping pattern that produces most of Pakistan's agricultural output is not the best for the country. This pattern is not the outcome of the farmers' own well-informed decisions about what to grow in order to produce the maximum possible profit for themselves. It is, instead, inherited from the British raj and is sustained by government policies. In the early years of the twentieth century, the British made a deliberate decision to use the canal colonies of Punjab and Sind as insurance against famines in the rest of India. This policy was set out in the reports of the various royal commissions that were set up to analyse the causes and consequences of India's many famines. It was the British intention to turn northwest India—in particular the provinces of Punjab and Sind into the sub-continent's granary. At about the same time, the British decided to use their colonies for supply essential raw materials for their domestic industry. The cultivation of cotton was thus promoted in Punjab and Sind as well as in Sudan. If this analysis is correct, then the conclusion it points to is obvious: A cropping pattern developed in response to a colonial government's need to maintain law and order (recurrent famines were considered to pose a considerable threat to the British raj) and to provide raw materials for the home industry needs to be looked at carefully to see if such a pattern still makes a great deal of sense.

SECOND PREMISE

The second premise is based on this conclusion: The present cropping pattern in Pakistan does not fully conform to what should be its development objectives. Pakistan's agriculture is now poised for producing large exportable surpluses, and has now made the transition from a subsistence to surplus economy. The achievement of this transition should lead one to ask whether the economies of subsistence agriculture are the same as those of surplus agriculture. The answer is obvious: a sector that is now geared to generating large surpluses must be provided with a different policy framework than one geared towards feeding country's population. Some past policies, especially those pertaining to subsidies on imports and procurement prices for output, now prove to be very expensive.

All available evidence seems to suggest that the price for obtaining large exportable surpluses of grains will make it very difficult for Pakistan to compete with established exporters such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina. Of course, anything can be sold at a price, but it would be very wasteful to earn a dollar of foreign exchange at a price of twenty rupees by exporting wheat. My calculations indicate that this may be the return should exports of wheat from Pakistan go beyond the level of one million tons. Dependence on the export of cotton, although it is more cost effective than wheat, is equally precarious, as demonstrated by the developments of the past year. Besides, a cropping pattern that causes the loss of two percentage points in the rate of growth of the gross domestic product needs to be looked at very carefully.

If, in the long run, wheat and cotton are not very good candidates for export, then what should take their place? This is a legitimate question, especially in view of the two assertions made in the very first paragraph of this article. The answer is that Pakistan's agricultural system is better equipped for the production of such high value added crops and products as fruits, vegetables, oil seeds of various kinds, flowers, poultry, meat and dairy products. There is a growing market for all these products not only in the Middle East but also in the now high wage economies of East Asia. Such a change would have to be induced, and to do so would necessitate considerable reorientation in government policies concerning prices, domestic production of imports, creation of a rural infrastructure and provision of credit.

Many criticisms can be—and

perhaps will be—levelled at the strategy proposed above. I will mention three at this point. First concerns the culture in which our farming community operates, which has been dominated for nearly a century by wheat. Changing it would not be easy; it would mean fighting against traditions and ingrained cultural practices. This point is not as frivolous as it may sound. Economists have begun to learn the value of comprehending cultural imperative before advocating significant changes. If the cropping pattern is to be changed in Pakistan, it will have to be done slowly.

Second, it is often said that no country as large as Pakistan or in its kind of geo-political situation should risk dependence on food-grain imports. This is true, but the proposed change in the pattern of cropping is concerned only with the exportable surplus. Pakistan should continue to aim to increase its grain output by about 3.5 percent a year. This would be sufficient to accommodate the needs of both an expanding population and a population experiencing a significant increase in incomes. But to aim beyond that is to generate exportable surpluses that would be difficult or costly to sell. Once the country has developed confidence in its ability to export high value added crops, it might contemplate bringing about a more profound change in the cropping pattern. A decade from now, it may be feasible for instance to exchange eggs, onions, mangoes and roses to the Middle East and East Asia for wheat from Argentina.

COMPARISONS

The third criticism concerns the comparison often made between East Punjab and Pakistan's Punjab. Wheat dominates the agriculture of East Punjab; East Punjab generates a much higher proportion of marketable surplus per unit of cropped land than the Punjab in Pakistan. What is good for East Punjab should also be good for the Punjab on this side of the border. There is an important flaw in this argument. East Punjab is a small surplus state in a very large food deficit country. Pakistan's Punjab is a large province in a country in which even a smaller province would generate surpluses. Thus, comparison made to support a certain cropping pattern is not a valid one. India still confronts the problem the British sought to solve in the early years of the present century. Pakistan is no longer a food deficit country, it must, therefore, learn to exploit its agricultural potential in a very different way.

ARMS PRODUCTION DISCUSSED, SELF-RELIANCE STRESSED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Aug 84 Magazine pp 5, 7

[Article by Salim Mehmud]

[Text]

Since the end of World War II, although there has been no direct clash between the Super Powers, no less than 130 military conflicts have been fought, all in the developing countries. Current world military spending stands at US \$ 660 billion per year, out of which US \$ 450 billion are on account of military hardware. Of military expenditures, the developed countries account for nearly 75% of the world total. To support the international arms industry there is an estimated number of 25 million persons employed in regular armies of the world and an equal number in the para-military forces. Besides, 5 million workers are directly engaged in the arms production industry. Another 4 million civilians are working in defence departments and 3 million scientists and engineers are conducting research and development in military technology. All told, those concerned with weapons as users, manufacturers or in other areas number over 70 million people which, by any standard, is a very large entity.

Out of the 90 developing countries which have been either directly or indirectly involved in post World War II conflicts, only 12 have the capacity to produce some of the weapons used in these

conflicts. The 120 non-oil producing developing countries account for 16% of the world's military expenditure, having as high as a one-third share in the international arms trade. On the other hand, the indigenous capacity of these countries represents no more than 5% of this expenditure. The situation is even more glaring when one considers the fact that a few Middle Eastern countries account for another one-third of the international arms trade. To highlight the lopsidedness of the defence expenditure of developing countries, one could quote the World Bank figures according to which some of the poorest countries are spending, as percentage of their GNP, even more than Western industrial countries. Whereas the percentage in respect of Western industrial countries is 3.8%, (6.5% for US and 10-12% for the USSR) as Tanzania spent 9.4%, Somalia 6.8% and Pakistan 5.0% of GNP on defence.

With a quantum rise in the prices of oil in 1973, the revenues of the oil producing countries rose sky high. Some of these countries, with hefty purses at their disposal, succumbed to the temptation of going in for the most sophisticated and expensive weapons available in the world market. Tremendous impetus was given to the international arms trade which has continued to register a steep rise especially over the past one decade. During the period 1977-81, it was in the range of US\$ 120-140 billion. A full two-third of this total, amounting to US\$ 70 billion, was on account of the purchases made by the developing countries - Middle Eastern countries exceeding all others combined. The international arms trade has already exceeded US\$ 30 billion per annum.

having overtaken the trade of wheat and rice put together.

According to one projection, during the period 1982-87, US\$ 60 billion worth of military equipment and services are likely to flow into the Middle East market from the US and the Western Europe. The Eastern bloc countries may also export arms and related services of equal amount to this region. The exports may comprise 3,200 different types of aircrafts: fighters, transports and helicopters; over 200,000 missiles of all types; 6,800 tanks and armoured vehicles and a variety of naval-crafts, artillery pieces and small arms.

DEMAND

The insatiable desire of both the developed and the developing countries to stockpile weapons within their maximum financial resources is giving rise to a burgeoning demand for weapons. Israel tops the list with 26% of the market of arms exports to the developing countries. Brazil is following closely with a share of 21%. The line up arranged in terms of rank order is: Israel, India, Brazil, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Argentina, Taiwan, Korea (South), Philippines, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, Korea (North), Pakistan, Singapore, Iran, Colombia, Portugal, Greece, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Mexico, Malaysia, Burma, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe and Libya.

Though India at present is ranking as No. 2 in terms of arms exports potential, there is no doubt that with large infrastructure and special emphasis on development of military industry, India will be on top of the list of arms exporting developing countries within next 3-5 years.

Why is there such spin-OFF a rush to develop the technology of arms production and go for arms export? There are several reasons for it. The weapons industry has generally given impetus to scientific and technological research and development which in turn entails spin off benefits directly impinging upon industrial activity in the commercial and consumer product areas. The overall impact thus has economic bearing of a profound magnitude. Not only this the defence industry provides employment to a large complement of professional as well as non-professional nationals of arms exporting countries. Then there is political leverage which arms exporting countries exercise through choosing the client states to

whom some of these "sophisticated" weapons are sold. Influence is further extended when the engineers of the supplying country are required to maintain, and sometimes even operate, such weapon systems. Maximum leverage is exercised when the client state needs maintenance spares which are sold at exorbitant prices and may even be totally withheld in emergencies when these arms may be used in situations in conflict with the foreign policies in vogue of the supplier countries. The preponderance of electronics may account for 40 per cent of the cost of the weapon system. All told, modern weapon systems cut across a very broad spectrum of disciplines horizontally. Not only that, there is also vertical depth in each of these disciplines in order that a workable weapon system can be realised. Diversified high technology fields such as microelectronics, computers, fibre optics, lasers, material sciences, microwaves, opto-electronics and radars are integral to the production of modern weapon systems. Research and development is being undertaken at a hectic pace particularly in the developed countries to further improve upon these technologies which should result in reduction of size of the weapons and greatly improve its capability and precision. Apart from latest technologies, it is important to follow latest techniques for designing and manufacturing of these weapons. These techniques involve computer aided drafting, computer aided design and then computer aided manufacturing. The systems are so complex that without the assistance of high speed computers it is well nigh impossible to undertake their design in acceptable time scales.

All told, it should bring home the point that to design and produce modern weapon systems calls for a very broad infrastructure of industries and research and development organisations backed up by universities not only to produce the high quality and highly qualified manpower in sufficient numbers but also to undertake research and development in basic sciences and applied technologies. A natural corollary of this requirement is the need for large capital investments in the entire efforts.

STAFF SHORTAGE

Pakistan is not in too happy a position in meeting any of the aforesaid requirements. Currently

there are about 19 universities in the country whose main problem has been serious shortage of qualified and trained teaching staff and lack of laboratory facilities for practical work. The combined budget of all these universities is of the order of Rs. 700 million – an amount which is less than the annual expenditure incurred by one medium sized university in a developed country, for example, MIT which has a graduate strength of about 2000 and annual budget of US\$ 300 million. Our graduates being turned out have very little awareness of the requirements of industry and other R&D organisations in the country. In order for the graduates of the universities to be able to contribute to the socio-economic uplift of the country, it is necessary that they be associated at a very early phase with the industry, R&D organisations and other institutions, in a manner that they can have an appreciation of the problems of the industry. Such an arrangement can best be brought about through conducting contract research on behalf of the industry and other organisations in the universities and positioning not only the undergraduate and graduate students in the industry and R&D organisations but their teaching staff as well, who could serve as consultants. So far there is no such tradition in Pakistan.

Also required is an improvement of standard of teaching particularly at the institutions of higher learning like the universities, establishment of a number of goal oriented vocational training schools and colleges, promotion of R&D activity in the universities especially directed towards solution of problems faced by the industry and other outside organisations, strengthening and reorganisation of existing R&D institutions and harmonisation of Government policies so as to support all measures which aim at achieving self reliance in defence industry.

Not only that the output of the universities suffers from quality but also it is very limited. The number of engineering graduates passing out every year from all the universities of Pakistan total no more than 30-35 per million of population which is one of the lowest in the world. In Japan, the corresponding figure is 750 engineering graduates per million and in India it is 150 engineering graduates per million. Generally the excuse is that since even the present limited supply of engineers cannot be all accommodated for providing them jobs, we cannot enhance the capacity of the univer-

sities to produce more engineers. Shortage of suitably qualified and experienced scientists and engineers gives rise to a vicious circle. One can start with the universities: their standard of teaching and capacity to do research and development (R&D) work lower. This, combined with shortage of funds, prevents the universities from undertaking any worthwhile R&D work, and the number of graduates passing out from these universities is small and their proficiency low. Consequently the indigenous industry is essentially consumer products oriented involving low technology. The industries neither having their own R&D cells nor the benefit of university research. We cannot compete in the international market. Thus there is growing slump in the national economy thereby reducing job opportunities for the professional manpower. This brings us full circle around. The overall effect is cumulative and very damaging to national development.

How could the existing shortcomings of the universities be overcome and country prepared to face the challenge posed by the rapid developments in high technology on the international scene? One of the steps should be to establish a number of advanced institutes of science and technology in the country on the pattern of the institutes established, for example, in Korea, Taiwan, India, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These countries sought the assistance of renowned international organisations such as Battle Memorial Institute, MIT and the Cal-Tech of the US, and Imperial College of Science and Technology of the UK in these projects. According to a conservative estimate the vacancies awaiting R&D organisations, industry and government organisations runs into thousands. The second role of such institutes should be to undertake research in basic sciences and applied technology particularly covering high technology fields which are commercially useful for industry, including the weapons production industry. This interaction or linkages can only be brought about by undertaking contract research at the institute on the behest of the outside organisations with the full cooperation and collaboration

of the professional staff of the organisations for which this goal-oriented research is conducted. The Federal Ministries for Planning and Development and Education of Government of Pakistan have embarked on preparation of a proposal for establishment of such an advanced Institute of Science and Technology at Islamabad which would turn out about 140 Master's degree holders about half of which may pursue higher studies at the Institute leading to the Ph.D. degree which would require additional 3-4 years of study. The Institute would also interact with foreign counterpart organisations and will provide fellowships for the scholars of developed and developing countries. According to a conservative estimate, the Institute would require a capital investment of \$75 million for establishment and operating expenditure of \$20-25 million.

Pakistan's industry is mainly geared to produce consumer products which involves low technology. In fact a majority of units only deal with mundane work such as packaging, blending or assembling. The basic criteria for selection of a particular industry was and continues to be the potential of the selected industry to yield highest possible returns and also to enable total recovery of capital investment in as short a period as 2-3 years. The leading industry of the country, the textile industry is in the doldrums. The days of cheap labour are gone and, therefore, the competitive edge of the developing countries like Pakistan against the developed countries in these labour intensive industries of the past is no more there. The national industry finds itself beleaguered by strong international competition. The export market, even for traditional products like cotton yarn and textiles, is eroding rapidly. Unless appropriate corrective measures are taken at the earliest by the industry, what to talk of international market, even the home market will be lost. As it is, there is really no move to improve and, therefore, one can read the writing on the wall i.e. with the lifting of protections, the local industry will collapse under its own weight.

ARTICLE DISCUSSES POPULATION, RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Aug 84 pp 7, 9

[Article by Sultan S. Hashmi & A. Razzaque Rukanuddin]

[Text] PAKISTAN with an estimated population of 93 million as of Mid 1984 is the ninth largest populated country of the world. Since independence the population has increased two and a half times from 32.5 million 1947 to 84.2 million in 1981.

If the current rate of population growth of about 3 per cent continues the present population might double itself in about 23 years compared to the world population which might double itself in 41 years and Asian countries' 39 years to double their populations. On the other hand developed countries might take as long as 111 years.

Pakistan has the highest rate of growth among the first ten populous countries of the world. It is even higher than the overall average for the developing countries as well as Asian countries for which the growth rate is recorded as 2.0 per cent and 1.8 per cent, respectively. The country has already excelled Nigeria by replacing it from ninth to tenth position. If the same trend of population growth continues it may even excel Bangladesh and Japan in the next 2-3 decades, (Table .1)

Distribution F Population

The population of the country is unevenly distributed among various provinces. Punjab with one fourth of the total area of the country is inhabited (according to 1981 Population Census) 56.5 per cent of the total population. Sind with 17.5 per cent of the land area has 22.6 per cent of the national total whereas total NWFP and FATA with 13 per cent of the total area have 15.7 per cent of the national population.

Baluchistan which has the largest area (43.6 per cent of the national total) has the smallest population (5.2 per cent of the national totals). Since the four provinces of the country have been experiencing different growth rates during the last four decades, their contributions to total population have also been changing overtime.

PAKISTAN RANKED IN RELATION TO THE TEN LARGEST POPULATED COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, GROWTH RATE AND RANK ORDER IN TERMS OF AREA.

Rank according to Population Size	Countries	Population (in million) Mid-1982	Average Annual Rate of Growth of Population	Rank order in terms of Land Area (1970-82)
			4	5
1	2	3		
(I)	China	1008	1.4	3rd
(II)	India	717	2.3	7th
(III)	U.S.S.R.	270	0.9	1st
(IV)	U.S.A.	232	1.0	4th
(V)	Indonesia	152	2.3	15th
(VI)	Brazil	127	2.4	5th
(VII)	Japan	118	1.1	56th
(VIII)	Bangladesh	93	2.6	88th
(IX)	Pakistan	87	3.0	34th
(X)	Nigeria	(92) 91	2.6	31st

When we look at the distributional aspect in terms of population density, we observe that due to varying growth patterns of provincial populations, their population densities have changed differently (Table-2).

POPULATION DENSITY (PERSONS PER SQUARE KILOMETERS) OF PAKISTAN AND PROVINCES FOR CENSUS YEARS 1951, 1961, 1972 & 1981				
Area	Density Per Square Kilometers			
	1951	1961	1972	1981
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pakistan	42	54	82	106
NWFP (including Tribal Areas)	79	102	113	148
Punjab (including Islamabad)	99	124	183	230
Sind	44	59	100	135
Baluchistan	3	4	7	13

The population densities of the provinces of Sind and Baluchistan have increased more than three-folds and four-folds respectively during the last four decades whereas increases in the case of Punjab and NWFP have been more than two-folds and around two folds respectively. However, the population density of Pakistan as a whole has increased from 42 persons per square kilometer to 106 persons per square kilometer during the above mentioned period. Moreover, it may be observed that Punjab is the most densely settled province; followed by NWFP and Sind with Baluchistan having the largest surface area is the least populated of all.

The urban population in the country has increased from 17.8 per cent in 1951 to 26.0 per cent in 1972 and to 28.3 per cent in 1981. The growth of urban population in various provinces has been very uneven. Sind is the most urbanised province with 43 per cent of its population living in urban area. If the population of Karachi City (5.1 million) is excluded, then the urban population of Sind declines from 43 per cent to 16 per cent. The urban population of Punjab is 28 per cent followed by NWFP and FATA 21 per cent and Baluchistan 16 per cent (Table-3).

TABLE: 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE, AREA
DENSITY AND RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES, BY MAJOR
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, PAKISTAN, 1981.

Area (K.M.) ²	Population Distribution by Residence (000's)			Density (per (K.M.) ²)	Sex Ratio (M/F-X)	Proportion of Land Area	Proportion of Popu- lation (100)	
	1	2	3					
Pakistan	796,095	84,253	23,844 (28.3)	60,409	106	111	100.0	100.0
N.W.F.P.	74,521	11,061	1,659 (15.0)	9,402	148	109	9.4	13.1
Quetta	27,220	2,199	—	2,199	81	108	3.4	2.6
Punjab	205,344	47,292	13,005 (27.5)	34,287	230	111	25.8	56.1
Sind	140,914	19,029	8,240 (43.3)	10,789	135	111	17.7	22.6
Baluchistan	347,190	4,332	676 (15.6)	3,656	12	112	43.6	5.2
Islamabad	906	340	204 (60.0)	136	375	119	0.1	0.4

NOTE: Figures in parentheses of Col. 4 indicate proportion urban Population.

Age and Sex Composition of Population

SEX COMPOSITION: The population of Pakistan is known for its high sex ratio but it has consistently improved from 1223 males per 1000 females in 1961 to 1129 males in 1972 and to 1110 in 1981.

The unusually high sex ratio in Pakistan may be attributed to a number of factors such as (i) higher sex ratio at birth than 105, which is a theoretical figure. (ii) Better coverage of males than females; and (iii) Higher female mortality than males.

AGE COMPOSITION: The age distribution of a population is mainly the by-product of a fertility schedule. High fertility connotes a high proportion of children in the population. The 1981 Census reported that 45 per cent of the population was under 15 years of age, 51 per cent comprised of productive population in the age 15-64 years while 4 per cent comprised of older persons 65 years and above. One major reason for the increase in the proportion of child population in 1981 as compared to earlier census years is partly due to outflow of about 1.5 million persons (mainly adults) abroad mainly to the Middle East during the intercensal period.

DEPENDENCY BURDEN: The percentage of children under 15 years of age plus those aged 65 years and over to working population aged 15-64 years constitutes the dependency ratio of the population. The dependency ratio for Pakistan is 97 compared to 54 for developed countries, 69 for Asian countries, 49 for USA and 56 for Sweden.

MARITAL STATUS AND FEMALE AGE AT MARRIAGE: The social and cultural norms prevalent in Pakistan favour universality of marriage. In the last four censuses about 95 per cent of the women were reported as married in the age span of 15-39 years.

The 1981 Census reported for females 15 years and above: 18 per cent single; 73 per cent currently married; 9 per cent widowed and only 0.4 per cent divorced. Evidence available from various national sample surveys and population censuses indicate that the singulate age at marriage of females in Pakistan has increased from 18 years in 1951 to 21 years in 181.

Education

Education is a vital investment for any human resource development. It is one of the best investments a country can make for future socio-economic growth and welfare of the society. It is education that changes attitude and behaviour of people towards improving environment, small family norm and quality of life in general.

LITERACY LEVEL: The literacy rate in the country has been continuously rising due to gradual expansion in educational facilities and the overall socio-economic development in the country. The literacy rate for the population is reported in the censuses has from 16 per cent in 1961 to 22 percent in 1972 and to 26 per cent in 1981 at an annual rate of half a per cent only compared to 3 per cent growth rate of population. However, sharp differences are noted in the literacy rates of males and females and also in rural and urban areas.

It is a matter of concern that even after 35 years of independence the literacy rate in the country is only 26 per cent and Pakistan ranks almost at the bottom among the developing countries in respect of literacy attainment.

Educational Attainment

According to 1981 Census, out of 13.2 million people who had reported some level of education, 45 percent had passed primary education (69 percent males 31 per cent females), 23 per cent had passed middle level (75 per cent males, 25 per cent females), 20 per cent had passed matric (77 per cent males 23 per cent females). After matric the percentage falls to 6 per cent for intermediate 4 per cent for B.A/B.Sc and only 1 per cent for M.A/M.Sc. The percentage of Engineering and Medical graduates was 0.28 percent (37 thousands) and 0.25 per cent (33 thousands) respectively.

It is noted that half of children of primary age group are enrolled in schools. The corresponding proportion is 81 per cent for males and 30 per cent for females. Primary education in Pakistan is characterised by high drop out the repeater rates.

About 50 per cent students fail to complete the five year cycle and higher repeater rates have led to congestion of the system with overage students. The quality of physical facilities are also poor particularly in rural areas. The enrolment ratio of children attending secondary school (10 to 14 years) is 15 per cent for both sexes, 22 per cent for males and 8 per cent for female. The gross enrolment ratio of school going children at each level (i.e. primary, secondary and college) is very low in Pakistan when compared to developing and developed countries. The differences are quite marked for female population.

It may also be pointed that the Student-Teacher ratio in the primary level has consistently deteriorated. In 1960 this ratio was 39 In 1970 it increased to 41 and in 1978 it further increased to 43 indicating a widening gap between supply and demand of facilities. This ratio might have also increased for secondary and higher levels.

Educational Goals in Sixth Plan

The Sixth Five Year Plan envisages to increase literacy rate to about 50 per cent and primary school enrolment from 48 per cent in 1982-83 to 75 per cent by the end of the plan period 1987-88. The targets are: 90 per cent for boys and 60 per cent for girls. In order to attain these targets the number of primary and mosque schools will be increased from 75 thousand (including 8200 mosque schools) to 115 thousand by the end of the Sixth Five Year Plan.

The Plan further envisages to increase the participation rate in Classes VI to VIII from 26 per cent to 33 per cent and for classes IX and X from 15 per cent to 20 percent by the year, 1978-88. A sum of Rs. 7 billion is allocated during the Sixth Plan for expanding primary education and the mass literacy programme in the country. A total of Rs 20.5 billion has been allocated in the Sixth Plan for the educational activities. This will be in addition to Rs. 35.5 billion required to meet the recurring expenditure thus bringing the total amount to Rs. 56 billion during the period 1983-88, which will still be 1.9 per cent of GNP on an annual basis.

Health

Rapid growth of population, low per capita income inadequate nutrition, crowded and insanitary living conditions are the root of the high incidence and prevalence of morbidity. High frequency of pregnancy and births also affect health conditions relating to birth complications, infectious diseases among infants and children and excessive infant child and maternal mortality.

The life expectancy of birth as estimated in the Sixth Plan for 1983 is around 55 for males and 54 for females. Infant mortality is estimated at 100 per thousand births, child mortality (1-4) is estimated at 10-12 per 1000 child population. Maternal mortality is estimated at 6-8 per 1000 live births.

There is still a sufficient scope for reducing the incidence and prevalence of morbidity; mortality particularly of infants, children and mothers.

THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION PARTICIPATING IN MEXICO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION.
6TH TO 13TH AUGUST 1984.

1. Dr. Mrs. Attiya Inayatul-
lah, Adviser to the Pres-
ident on Population –
(Leader).
2. Mr. M.A. Kareem Iqbal,
Secretary, Population Wel-
fare Division.
3. Begum Kalsoom Saif
Ullah, Member, Majlis-e-
Shoora.
4. Dr. Abdul Razzaque Ruk-
anuddin, Director General,
NIPS.
5. His Excellency Amir Us-
man, Pakistan Ambassador
to Mexico.

It is estimated that 30 per cent of all reported cases of illness and 40 per cent of all deaths in Pakistan are attributed to water borne diseases. Over 50 per cent of the population live in areas where malaria vectors are prevalent. Therefore, the future improvement in health conditions and reduction in mortality will largely depend on environmental and hygienic living conditions.

HEALTH FACILITIES: The distribution of population per medical personnel and health facilities as of 1983

While the share of population in the rural areas is 72 per cent, the public health facilities are particularly inadequate. For example more than four fifth of hospital beds are available in urban areas and more than four fifths almost half of the Dispensaries/MCH Centres/Basic Health Units are located in urban areas.

It is evident that the existing public health facilities in rural areas are inadequate to cope with the rapidly growing population.

In spite of the progress achieved in the recent past, the health allocation and per capita expenditure on health, and health facilities in the country are still quite low compared to many developing countries.

Sixth Plan Objectives for Health Sector

The Sixth Plan lays emphasis on improving facilities and reducing communicable diseases, immunisation of children and elimination of malnutrition among children etc. The provision of safe water supply in rural areas is expected to increase from 22 per cent to 45 per cent and drainage and sanitation facilities from 4 per cent to 10 per cent.

During the Sixth Five Year Plan period, it is envisaged that the life expectancy will increase from 55 to 60 years. This will be attained by reducing infant, child, maternal and overall mortality level in the country.

FOOD AND NUTRITION: The bulk of the diet of the people in Pakistan consist of wheat which constitute 83 per cent of the total cereal intake.

The consumption of protective food such as meat, fish, eggs, fruits, vegetables and dairy products etc. is quite meagre compared to developed countries and falls short of the requirements of a balanced diet recommended by F.A.O.

The per capita calorie intake (2313) is mainly derived from carbohydrate foods (81 per cent) such as cereals, starchy roots and sugar, compared to 57 per cent in the developed regions of the world. The per capita intake of animal proteins in Pakistan is about 13 grams. The figure is substantially lower compared to developed countries and the world average. The findings of two nutrition surveys have shown that the poor quality of nutritional diets are mainly responsible for severe malnutrition among children and adults particularly among females in the form of specific deficiency diseases like anaemia, Conjunctival Pollar, Conjunctival Dryness, Keratomalacia, Rickets and Ostemalacia.

It has been estimated that about half of the individuals in the Nutrition Survey did not meet the criterion of full recommended dietary allowance, with one-fourth of them consuming even less than 70 per cent of the recommended dietary allowance.

It is further observed that the prevalence of anaemia is almost twice as common among pregnant and lactating women as compared to the rest of the female population. The prevalence of goitre is more than twice as high among this group of women than for the population as a whole.

HOUSING: The rate of growth of housing during 1973-80 has been 2.7 per cent per annum compared 3.0 per cent rate of population growth. As a result of this, the habitation density increased from 6.2 person in 1973 to 6.7 persons in 1980 indicating a deterioration in the living conditions. The average number of persons per room during the same period increased from 3.0 to 3.5. Of all the housing units in 1980 52 per cent comprised of one room only. For urban-rural areas the percentages of one room housing units were 55 and 43 respectively. Moreover, the average occupancy for one room housing units was 6 persons and 1.5 persons per room for [word(s) illegible] more room housing units. Approximately 45 per cent of the total population of Pakistan resides in one room housing units compared to 0.8 per cent of total population living in 5 and more room housing units. These extremes reveal that the skewed housing distribution has resulted in over-crowded living conditions in the country.

EXISTING HOUSING CONDITIONS AND FACILITIES: It is noted that about two-thirds (63 per cent) of the houses in the country are katchs. As regards facilities it is observed that only 31 per cent houses had access to electricity, 13 per cent had access to piped water inside the housing units and 8 per cent had

piped water access outside the housing unit. Twenty nine per cent had inside house latrine facility while 22 per cent had independent bath facilities. The housing conditions in terms of structure and facilities have been quite deplorable in rural areas of the country.

It may be concluded that the majority of the existing stock of housing comprised of kutcha housing units, which lacked essential facilities like electricity, piped water, kitchenats, bath rooms and toilets. The higher population density coupled with the absence of basic service amenities in kutcha housing units is indicative of deteriorated overall housing and living conditions. In brief, the problem of housing in Pakistan emerges as one of the greatest concern and its major cause, evidently, seems to be the population pressure stemming from rapid population growth. Moreover, in this regard other factors such as rapid urbanization which has created permanent slums and overcrowding in the cities alongwith escalating construction costs, income inequalities and inadequacy of government finances have further contributed to the environmental problems of the country.

HOUSING REQUIREMENTS DURING SIXTH PLAN: It is estimated that there is a shortage of 1.45 million housing units in the country. The situation is likely to worsen because of additional incremental demand resulting in further increase of slums, shanty towns and kutchi abadis.

The Sixth Plan envisages current annual incremental demand for housing to be 134 thousand for urban 135 thousand for rural areas.

Resources and Environment

There is a growing concern with regard to population growth and utilisation of resources particularly in the context of environmental deterioration. The WAPDA recommended for the more rational use of natural resources which are depleting with the rapid growth of population.

The population pressure is already putting heavy strain on country's limited natural resources such as manpower, water, soil, forests, fisheries, wildlife, mineral resources and energy etc. Pakistan has immense fragile semi-arid and desert areas whose productivity as a range-land is already seriously under environmental threat.

With rapid growth of population in relation to increase in the use of natural resources, there has been resource and environmental deterioration in the country over the past three decades. This has led to cutting down of forests for fire-wood and constructions, land clearing for food production resulting in soil erosion and infertility, salination and the drying up of streams. Similarly, over grazed grass lands have led to desertification especially in Baluchistan. Without well planned conservation policies and actions, those problems are being further aggravated.

In view of rising expectations of the rapidly growing population, there is an increasing pressure on the utilization of resources of the country. There is an urgent need for Government's intervention through demographic and non-demographic policies to create a sustainable balance between resource utilization and the augmentation of resource base.

The major environmental problems country is facing include the following:

HUMAN RESOURCES AND EMPLOYMENT: In Pakistan, the size of civilian labour force increased from 19.0 million in 1972 to 22.2 million in 1981. The mid 1984 estimates indicate that there are about 28.3 million persons in the labour force to which it is expected will be added 0.75 million persons every year in the future.

The labour force participation rate of total population of Pakistan has been rather low (28 per cent) when compared to 42 per cent for the world, 41 per cent for developing countries and 38 per cent for South Asian Countries; 37 per cent for Malaysia and 38 per cent for Indonesia. There is a wide variation reported for the labour force participation rates of males (52 per cent) and females (2 per cent). The low female participation rate partly attributed to under reporting has depressed the overall labour force participation rate of the country. Moreover, it is estimated that about 10 per cent of the labour force is currently working aboard.

Four per cent of the labour force is estimated to be unemployed. The unemployed are predominantly educated youth who have completed high school education and above. In addition to open unemployment, labour under utilization, often termed as under employment, is quite high. Using the time utilization criterion defining those who work less than 35 hours per week under employment accounts for one-fourth of the employed persons. If alternatively income criterion is used i.e. those who fail to earn subsistence income, under-employment increases to 35 per cent. Under-employment will be even higher if mismatch criterion is adopted to estimate under-employment. Roughly one-fourth of the employed labour force is made up of unpaid family helpers, predominantly found in rural areas.

Employment patterns simply mirror the productive structure of the economy. Agriculture accounts for over 52 per cent of the labour force even though non-agriculture sector exhibited a faster growth rate of labour absorption than the agriculture sector during the last 10 years. The highest growth in employment was recorded in electricity, gas and water (8.7 per cent) followed by construction (7.4 per cent) during 1971-84. Manufacturing sector registered a growth rate of 4.1 per cent and its share in total employment went up from 12.9 per cent to 14.9 per cent during the same period.

Even if the population Welfare Programme is successfully implemented from now on, it will have no effect on the size of the labour force at least for 15 years. If the labour force growth rate of 3 per cent remains constant until the year 1988, about 3.7 million additional jobs would have to be created even at the presently low level of participation. This will be in addition to the current backlog of un-employed and under employed labour force.

Land Utilisation and Agriculture

The cultivable area (cultivated area plus culturable waste) comprised 43 per cent of the total land area in 1971-72. This proportion increased to 45 per cent in 1981-82 showing an increase of 3.5 per cent over the 1971 to 1981

Pakistan	Both Sexes	Male	Female
Pakistan	26	35	16
Rural	17	26	7
Urban	47	55	37

period. The cultivated area constituted 27 per cent of total land area in 1971-72. which increased to 28.7 per cent in 1981-82 showing an increase of 3.6 percent over 1971-81 period. However, the cultivated areas as proportion of the cultivable area remained almost constant during the corresponding period.

Due to increase in population the arable land area in the country has declined from 0.488 hectare per person in 1971-72 to 0.340 hectare per person in 1981-82. Likewise the cultivated land, culturable waste land and forest area per person also declined from 1971-72 to 1981-82 (Table-6).

TABLE:6 ARABLE,CULTIVATED,CULTURABLE WASTEAND FOREST AREA (HECTRES) PER 1,000 PERSONS FOR PAKISTAN:1971-72 TO 1980-82

Years	Arable land (Hactre)per 1,000 persons	Cultivated land (Hectre) per 1,000 persons	Culturable waste (Hactre) per 1000 persons	Forest Area (Hectre)per 1,000 persons
1	2	3	4	
1971-72	488	307	181	43.8
1972-73	472	299	173	43.9
1973-74	463	294	169	43.2
1974-75	453	288	165	41.2
1975-76	435	283	152	40.5
1976-77	424	274	150	39.6
1977-78	419	270	149	38.8
1978-79	405	261	144	36.1
1979-80	406	256	150	34.8
1980-81	391	249	142	34.0
1981-82	340	241	99	33.1

The Sixth Five Year Plan has given high priority to agricultural sector as this sector accounts almost one-third of the total share of the Gross Domestic Product of the country and more than half of the labour force is working in this sector, with a share of export earnings accounting more than two third of the total exports.

The yield of major crops, such as wheat, rice, cotton, sugar-cane etc. in Pakistan is almost between half and one-fourth when compared to the production of several developing countries with similar situation as Pakistan.

The productivity of these crops in Pakistan per hectare is compared as under:-

- a) WHEAT: The yield of wheat at 1595 Kg per hectare is 54 per cent of the productivity of Egypt. 40% of Mexico, 3.2% France, 65% of USA 73% of Canada, and 25% of the highest yielding country Netherland whose productivity is 6701 Kg per hectare.
- b) RICE: The yield of rice at 1703 Kg per hectare is 48 per cent of the productivity of Egypt, 44% of the Republic of Korea, 31% of USA and 24% of the highest yielding country Gabon, whose productivity is 7200 Kg per hectare.
- c) COTTON: The yield of cotton at 364 Kg per hectare is 55% of Turkey, 39% of Egypt, 38% of Mexico and 22% of the highest yielding country, Sri-lanka whose productivity is 1647 Kg per hectare.
- d) SUGARCANE: The productivity at 35,672 Kg per hectare is 47% of the yield of Egypt, 35% of Kenya, 40% of USA 63% of India and 24% of the highest yielding country Ethiopia whose productivity is 150,000 Kg per hectare.

When growth of Population and production of all major crops is taken into account, it is observed that the population of the country increased by 93 per cent during the period 1959-60 to 1981-82 whereas the production of crops increased by 158 per cent. However, the food crops per capita in the country increased by only 28.6 per cent which seems to be quite low for a long period of 21 years.

The low yield per hectare coupled with deteriorating manland ratio, lack of scientific know-how and modern techniques, lack of water will continue to be the major obstacle for future development of this sector. Still there is a vast scope for increasing the productivity by modernizing the agriculture sector. There is also substantial scope for developing poultry and dairy, livestock and fisheries in the country.

Keeping in view the above mentioned limitations and constraints, Pakistan has been importing wheat until recent past. The bumper crops have enabled the country to accumulate modest surpluses. The position in respect of vegetable oil, milk and pulses is not encouraging as lot of foreign exchange is still invested on the import of these basic items.

Salinity and Water Logging

Pakistan has the largest irrigation system in the world. The irrigated lands of the Indus Basin and its tributaries cover about 34 million acres of land. However, canal system due to lack of maintenance is deteriorating. The irrigation system presents the largest single resources system is raising ground water level continuously resulting in increasing salinity and water logging.

Of the total affected area of 23.0 million acers, 12 million acres are severely affected. The extent of disastrous area having water table within five feet depth is estimated about 2.3 million acres in the country. Of the total

23 million acres, 13.6 million acres had been pro- problems in the country, increasing portions of this land are being rendered infertile or are loosing fertility. It is due to the fact that the teected from water logging and salinity upto June, 1982.

The twin menace of water logging and salinity poses great threat not only to country's agriculture but also affects the population distribution directly as people are forced to migrate. Special attention is being given to this vital issue and an allocation of Rs. 14.0 billion has been provided in the Sixth Plan for drainage and reclamation

Forestry

Forestry is at present only less than 4 per cent of the total land area of the country. This ranks Pakistan 113th out of 140 countries in the World. The desired level of forest area should range between 20-25 per cent. The efforts which are being made for the plantation of trees as all over the country are being negated by deforestation. Moreover, the influx of more than 3 million Afghan refugees whose needs for fuel-wood and their imported herds present special problems for forest and range management in the regions bordering Afghanistan.

Livestock

This sector is quite vital for national economy as milk, meat better, eggs, fish are some of the basic nutritional requirements. The supply of these nutrients cannot meet the increasing demand of the rapidity growing population.

Moreover hides, skins, wool and animal hair not only provide raw materials for domestic industry but the sources of foreign exchange earnings.

CSO: 4600/712

COMMENTARY ON 'SIND'S OUTLAWS'

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by "Linesman" in the "Between the Lines" column: "Sind's Outlaws"]

[Text]

LACK OF FAMILIARITY with Sind's rural scene causes surprise and bafflement at the recent rise in the number of dacoities and proliferation of bands of outlaws in some of its districts – to the extent that a special force is being raised to deal with the menace and the help of Sind's kite-flying Pir has been sought by the provincial administration.

Traditionally, going back to the British or even the Mughal era, parts of the sub-continent have always bred a Robin-Hood type of outlaw, who defied and resisted Authority, looted the rich and helped, or at least did not harm, the ordinary people. If he survived for some time, and was both generous and intrepid, he became part of the folklore with villagers ready to give him shelter and sing songs in his praise. Even in recent times, particularly in the poorer regions, outlawry has flourished. India's Madhya Pradesh, for example, has created many legends and has even a few heroines. The veteran Gandhite Vinoba Bhave tried to use soul force to convert the dacoits but failed; and at the end of his travels he is reported to have said that, considering living conditions, he was surprised that more people did not become dacoits.

Feudal pastime

In Pakistan after partition, the tradition has barely been kept alive and that too mostly in the poorer, barani areas. Of course, in other parts, even among the rich peasantry, cattle-lifters and dacoits have prospered and become big landlords; some have even graced the portals of our Assembly Chambers on account of services rendered to the Muslim League. And when landlords themselves do not take the trouble or risk to indulge in this pastime, they often act as patrons and protectors of well-known dacoits, using them as hired guns, or for humiliating opponents by getting a favourite horse or buffalo stolen, employing them to terrorise the ryot or round up voters at election time. Sometimes the service required includes attacks on the police, but more often the police is warned or cajoled to keep its nose out of the troubled area.

However, in this outlawry game, Sind was generally considered to lag far behind other provinces. Its Haris were far too oppressed and down-trodden to undertake any ventures on their own, and its landlords were considered to be a docile lot who preferred to spend their time devising

stupid ways of spending their un-earned wealth. This is not to say that crime on the traditional pattern of feudal society was unknown in rural Sind, but that the rate and scale were lower than other places.

What has happened?

What then has happened over the last one year to put Sind in the lead? Official spokesmen have been ambivalent in their assessment of the problem. Some still talk of all being well, except for occasional incidents. Others have sounded the tocsin and have decided on a policy that seeks to mount a major operation to wipe out the gangs of dangerous dacoits. The induction of Hurs in the pacification campaign is reported to have created a situation where more tribal clashes are feared. Even otherwise dacoits belonging to different tribes or districts are said to be engaged in fighting each other almost as often as they loot trains, stage a highway robbery or fight the police. It has also been said by the CMLA-President that this situation is not free of political germs, the implication being that it is in some way connected with the last MRD movement and its aftermath.

Whatever the truth, it is important that some agency should probe the situation and bring to light all the relevant economic, and social factors, so that proper measures can be taken to cope with it. And if there is a political streak that runs through the lawlessness in Sind, this aspect should certainly not be ignored.

CSO: 4600/711

PETITION CHALLENGING QADIANI ORDINANCE DISMISSED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 13 Aug 84 pp 1, 12

[Text]

A full bench of the Federal Shariat Court on Sunday held that the Presidential Ordinance regarding anti-Islamic activities of Qadianis did not violate the freedom of faith of the Qadianis or restrained them from practising their religion or affected their right of worship.

The court gave the verdict on two Shariat petitions filed by Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman and three others challenging the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahori Group, and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984.

The full bench of the Federal Shariat Court consisting of Mr. Justice Aftab Hussain, Mr. Justice Sardar Fakhre Alam, Mr. Justice Ch. Muhammad Siddique, Mr. Justice Maulana Malik Ghulam Ali and Mr. Justice Maulana Muhammad Abdul Quddus Qasri while dismissing the petitions held that:

(1) - "The allegations in the two petitions that the impugned Ordinance violates the freedom of faith of the Qadianis of either persuasion or restrains them from practising their religion or affects their right of worship is not correct. The said Ordinance does not interfere with the right of the petitioners or other Qadianis to profess and practise their religion in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. They are at liberty to profess

Qadianism or Ahmadism as their religion and to profess their faith in Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian as a Prophet or the promised Messiah or the promised Mehdi. They are also at liberty to practise their religion and worship inter alia in their places of worship according to the tenets of their religion.

(2) - The impugned Ordinance is consequential to the Constitutional Amendment of 1974 by which the Qadianis, whether belonging to the Lahori Group or others were declared non-Muslims in accordance with the dictates of Islamic Sharia. In implementation of the Constitutional fiat which was disregarded with impunity by the Qadianis, they have been restrained by the impugned Ordinance from directly or indirectly calling or posing themselves as Muslims as calling their faith as Islam. To call their places of worship by the name of Masjid (mosque) and to call people to prayers through Azan which (name for the place of worship and method for calling people to prayer) are exclusive for the Muslims and distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims, amounts to posing as Muslims. By the said name and the said call to prayers, the unwary among the Muslims are likely to be deceived and to be drawn to offer their prayers behind a non-Muslim Imam in a non-Muslim place of worship.

The prohibition against calling their places of worship as Masjid or calling Azan for prayer is thus consequential to the declaration of the Ahmadis or Qadianis as non-Muslims or prohibition against posing them as Muslims. The Qadianis can call their places of worship by any other name and call the adherents of their religion to prayer by use of any other method. This does not amount to interference with the right to profess or practise their religion.

(3)– The prohibition against the use of epithets, descriptions and titles etc. reserved for holy personages among the Muslims is also like-wise consequential and does not amount to interference with profession or practise or religion. The use by the Ahmadis of such epithets as Ameer-ul-Momineen, Khalifat-ul-Momineen, Khalifat-ul-Muslimeen in respect of Ahmadis or use of epithet of Ummul-Momineen for the wife of Mirza Sahib amounts to posing themselves as Momen or Muslim. The words Sahaaba or Radi-Allah-Anho are exclusive for the Companions of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and the Muslims. Similarly the epithet Ahle Bait is exclusive for the family of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). The use of such epithets by the Ahmadis not only

outrages the feelings of the Muslims but also amounts to their posing indirectly as Muslims. The prohibition does not interfere with the right of Ahmadis to profess and practise their religion.

4– The prohibition against propagation of the religion of Ahmadis is not contrary to the Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). This prohibition is also consequential to the declaration of Ahmadis or Qadianis as non-Muslims and restraint against their posing as Muslims. Their entire strategy in preaching is to try to satisfy the Muslim to whom they preach that by conversion to Ahmadism he shall remain a Muslim. This would be contrary to the Constitution”.

The FSC heard the petitions arguments in the petitions for 21 days.

The court also had the assistance of Juris-Consults, namely, Prof. Qazi Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, Prof. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Prof. Muhammad Ashraf of Peshawar University, Maulana Taj-ul-Din Haidri, Allama Mirza Yousuf Hussain and Maulana Saddr-ud-Din al-Rafai.

The Federal Government was represented by Dr. Riaz-ul-Hassan Gilani and Haji Sheikh Ghias Muhammad, advocates.

CSO: 4600/711

PORTS MANAGEMENT BODY PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Aug 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

LAHORE, Aug 12: A national shipping port trust council will be established soon to improve port working and management in Pakistan.

This was stated here today by the Federal Secretary, Communications Mr Fateh Khan Bandial at a meeting with the Executive Committee members of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The private sector will also be encouraged to invest in the shipping industry. Giving salient features of the proposed council, Mr Nadial said it would be a supervisory body working over and the above existing port trusts, and similar other organisations. It would look after development work, and recommend measures to improve port infrastructures.

However, before the establishment of the council certain added facilities will be made available at Port Qasim, including a Container Terminal Service (CTS) for up-country transportation of goods.

Regarding improvement in the telephone system in Lahore Mr. Bandial told the Committee that within a couple of weeks a latest digital telephone system with 10,000 lines, would start functioning. It would also remove certain flaws in the existing billing system.

CSO: 4600/711

COMMENTARY ON PRESS 'DO'S', 'DON'TS'

Karachi DAWN in English 11 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by A. T. Chaudri: "The Press: Do's and Don'ts"]

[Text]

SUCCESSIVE regimes in the country have drawn up catalogues of do's and dont's for the national Press and prescribed codes of conduct to reform the "delinquent" papers and tame the "errant" scribblers. In the process, Press laws and legal codes have proliferated, while the ethics of journalism and the credibility of its practitioners have steadily declined.

The reason is obvious. Journalism is not a command performance and the Press cannot thrive if the government tries to control or "govern" it. The trouble is that the Press and the government are two different professions, one must act, the other reacts. The Press should not only scrutinise and analyse but also objectively criticise — rather than publicise — every act of the Government. And that in the public interest.

Again, the government considers itself the master of the public; the Press looks upon the public as its master. Hence the conflict of interests. What is so galling about the conflict is that it is between unequals.

This conflict of unequals always goes on in a free society. But when the 'more equal' becomes intolerant of the 'less equal' and tries to throttle the voice of the gabby, rakish little "barbarians" the game is over. It was over during the Ayub era. Once you muzzle the Press by

promulgating obnoxious Ordinances and once you divide it by putting one section under official penumbra and by using it to knock down the other, you vitiate the free atmosphere of a free nation which only a free Press can create and recreate.

National Press

What is tragic in the case of Pakistan is that we had a national Press before we had a nation-State. One might even claim that the pre-Independence Muslim Press was the foster mother of this Islamic State. But after the nation gained independence, the Press lost its freedom — by slow, painful degrees, indeed.

In the mid-sixties, a stage was reached when a cry of anguish went up from the old guard of the Fourth Estate: "Make the Press base, degenerate and sycophant and you will have a base, degenerate and sycophant people."

Now, a growing awareness of the decline of the Press has apparently prompted those at the helm of power to arrest this downhill slide before the "new order" is ushered in. But instead of going straight and liquidating the Draconian Press laws, or withdrawing direct patronage from a set of pampered Papers and official news agencies, the government deems it prudent to take a circuitous route. It wants to formulate a new set of dont's for the Press and propose a new "pledge" for the Pressmen to raise the moral tone of journalism. But is it not too little

and too late?

Nobody would like to question the proposed "4-point pledge" which seeks to bind Pressmen to: (a) screen anti-national news and views from the broad sheets of a paper; (b) defy any directive against Islamic tenets and national ideology; (c) refuse to use the quill, or focus the eye of the camera, on obscenity and crime; and (d) resist the temptation to indulge in libel or bring respectable citizens into disrepute through scandalising.

A pertinent question, however, is: who would decide, and at what level, that a "copy" is, in part or whole, anti-national, subversive of ideology, or bordering on obscenity blackmail, libel and defamation? Unless the responsibility is clearly fixed, there may be ceaseless confusion and endless tension and conflict between the haves and have-nots of the Press. It is one thing to exhort the Pressmen and Press workers to "defy and resist" what is against their "conscience". But it is quite another to regulate their conduct in keeping with the dictates of responsibility and freedom, which must not negate each other either inside or outside the precincts of the Press.

Code of conduct

Nor can this problem be sorted out by forging a voluntary code of conduct. A code is evolved out of conventions, traditions and practices in a profession. It is not the other way round. Codes are at best instruments of self-control and self-restraint, not vehicles of ethical resurgence. And unless a code has moral, rather than legal sanction, it cannot foster the growth of a vigorous, vibrant Press which must stand guard over public interest not as an ally of the powers that be but as a rival force, an adversary with a social conscience.

This is not to suggest that there should be no code, and no set of do's, for the Press. What is more relevant is the nature of the do's and don'ts to which a journalist must be committed, if he is true to his salt.

For example, apart from upholding the ideals of his nation and owing allegiance to national interest, he must take a pledge to struggle for the freedom of the Press and for the free diffusion of views and news — the inviolate right of a free society.

He should also take a pledge to exercise whatever freedom he has in his country to help the growth of an intelligent, well-informed and responsible public opinion, which is the sheet-anchor of a dynamic polity. No journalist can discharge his social responsibility except by writing the truth, as he sees it, exposing half-truth and firmly and fearlessly opposing the untruth.

Here one might recall the famous message of Joseph Pulitzer to his paper, when he said goodbye: "I know my retirement will make no difference in its cardinal principles; that it will always fight for progress and reform; never tolerate injustice or corruption, always fight demagogues of all parties; never belong to any party, always oppose privileged classes and public plunderers; never lack sympathy with the poor, always remain devoted to public welfare; never be satisfied with merely printing news, always be drastically independent; never be afraid to attack wrong, whether by predatory plutocracy or..."

Quaid's example

This is the code of a responsible, crusading newspaper — a code prepared by a giant of journalism. In our part of the world, too, there were Press giants. In their hands, newspapers were not mere pedlars of news and views or gold mines dug by tycoons. Their journalism was crusade against mighty imperialists. It was a noble and heroic mission to change the very current of history and win sovereignty for a downtrodden people. If they succeeded in this mission, it was because they were non-conformists who did not subject themselves to do's and don'ts but regarded the freedom of expression as immutable.

The Quaid-i-Azam, for example, was the chairman of the "Bombay Chronicle's" Board of Directors. He suspended the publication of his paper in protest against the imposition of pre-censorship. He would not bend or toe the line. Nor did Jauhar and Zafar Ali Khan. They fought and fought hard against Press curbs and kept aloft the banner of press freedom even under foreign tutelage.

Today, it is a different story. The recurrent spells of Martial Law, the

operation of arbitrary Press laws, the long drawn-out censorship and baneful Press advice have all had a debilitating effect on the 'elan' of the national Press. The critical faculties of journalists appear to have been benumbed and even the morale of the reading public seems to have been eroded beyond repair. How to revive the pulse beat of the Press? What is needed is a shot of adrenalin in its heart — not a new code of ethics or a new package of do's and dont's.

The Press so badly bruised and damaged over the years cannot come into its own, unless a new breed of Pressmen is reared — a breed differently enfranchised, untrammelled by the craze for money, power and status, moving independently of the ordinary currents of life and "being capable of violent revolt and supreme sacrifice" to borrow a Churchillian phrase.

CSO: 4600/710

MAJOR PUSH FOR OBSERVANCE OF DAILY PRAYERS PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Aug 84 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, Aug 12: 'Nazim-i-Salaat, is to be introduced in the country from Independence Day, Aug 14, and the establishment of this system has been entrusted to the corps commanders under the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Dawn' learnt through highly-placed official sources on Sunday.

Explaining the system, these sources said that there would be a 'Nazim-i-Salaat' in every village in the rural areas and in each mohallah in urban areas. Generally, there would be one 'Nazim-i-Salaat' for every village, but the number could be higher in case of larger villages.

According to a directive issued by President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, the Nazims will be nominated persons from among doctors, hakeems and businessmen. Imams and khateeb will not be appointed 'Nazim-i-Salaat.' If possible, people who are councillors or members of Zakat and Ushr committees will also not be considered, as well as serving public servants, except school teachers, doctors and postal employees.

The Nazims will be appointed mostly under the supervision of the Armed Forces. However, they will be assisted by the civil administration, where necessary. The terms entrusted with the task of nominating people for appointment as Nazims will be selected by the Corps Commanders.

After flag-hoisting and the national anthem, people of each village and mohalla will hold local meetings where Defence personnel

will nominate the 'Nazim-i-Salaat, in public.

The President has directed that a 'Nazim-i-Salaat' should be pious, God-fearing and, preferably, literate.

The primary duty of a 'Nazim-i-Salaat' will be to persuade people to offer prayers regularly. Councilors, members of Zakat and Ushr committees and other Government functionaries have been directed to lend full support to the Nazims in making the new system a success.

A Nazim will send a written report to the Governor of his province on the third Friday of every month. In Azad Kashmir, the reports will be sent to the President, and in the Northern Areas, to the Commissioner.

A copy of the district-wise report prepared for the Governor will be forwarded to the President by name, alongwith copies of the selected reports of the Nazims. These reports will not be less than two each from the rural and urban areas.

According to the Presidential directive, "the establishment of 'Nazim-i-Salaat' will be undertaken as a military operation".

"It is a simple system, but it has to be established with it. This is not a political issue. It is the fulfilment of our obligation as Muslims. I expect a sincere-hearted involvement in the establishment and functioning," says the directive which has been sent to all top functionaries.

TAX HOLIDAY FOR NWFP INDUSTRIAL UNITS

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Aug 84 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Aug 12: The NWFP government has decided to exempt all industrial units in the province, starting their commercial production after July 1 next year from local taxes, octroi and export tax for a period of five years.

This was announced here on Sunday by the provincial Governor, Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, at the foundation stone laying ceremony of the industrial alcohol project at the Khazana Sugar Mills.

He said that the provincial government was providing all possible incentives and facilities to promote private investment to step up industrialisation of the province.

Emphasizing the need for ensuring accelerated pace of industrialisation in the province, in the wake of growing manpower at the rate of about one lakh persons every year, the Governor hoped that the entrepreneurs would come forward and avail of these incentives and facilities to enable the province to catch up with the other provinces in the industrial sector.

Earlier, Mr Iftikharuddin Khatak, Chairman of the Sarhad Development Authority, in his welcome address, explained the Authority's contribution in the industrial expansion in the

provinces.

Political detenues

Our Staff Correspondent adds:

Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq said on Sunday that the release of three remaining political detenues in the province would be considered after his return from Haj on Sept 16.

Talking to newsmen after the foundation-laying ceremony, the Governor said that former Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Mr Aftab Ahmed Sherapo and Nasirullah Babar would also be released in due course.

He was, however, noncommittal about the timing.

Mr Aftab Sherapo and Nasirullah Babar are now under house arrest. They were arrested at the time of the launching of protest campaign by MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) in August last year.

Questioned about the possibility of resignations by the cabinet ministers if they decide to contest the next general elections, the Governor said there was not a single instance in the sub-continent of ministers resigning for contesting elections. The ministers could contest elections if they otherwise qualified, he told another questioner.

CSO: 4600/710

RAZA KAZIM'S PETITION DISMISSED

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Aug 84 p 10

[Text]

LAHORE, Aug 1: A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, comprising Mr Justice Gul Mohammad Khan and Mr Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza, on Wednesday dismissed Mrs Nasim Raza Kazim's petition, challenging the detention of her husband.

The court in a brief order observed that since the Martial Law Administrator, Punjab, had taken cognisance of the case and decided that Mr Raza Kazim and others be tried by a military court, the petition stood abated.

Earlier, counsel for the petitioner, M. Aitzaz Ahsan, submitted in writing his arguments against the validity of the new order of the MLA issued on July 30, the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, and the powers of the courts under the order.

Relying upon the Omar Khan case (PLD, 1958, Lahore P.528) and the Asma Jilani case (PLD 1972, Supreme Court, P.139), the petitioner's counsel argued that the PCO, 1981, was beyond the legislative competence of the Chief Martial Law Administrator as the martial law imposed by him on July 5, 1977, was not of the category of martial law which was valid 'per se' as only the military law applicable to military personnel or the military law imposed by an army commander in occupied enemy territory was of such a species of martial law.

He submitted that martial law imposed by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977, was merely that species of martial law which required validation by reference to a limited set of circumstances (sometimes called State necessity) and remained valid sub-

ject only to:

(a) the continued transient existence of the pressing circumstances which required its promulgation;

(b) the Army commander remaining strictly within and subject to such circumstances or exigencies.

So long, and only so long as the foregoing condition remained could the martial law retain its conditional and limited validity. No Army commander or martial law administrator could overstep these limits.

Mr Aitzaz Ahsan submitted that if the circumstances that dictated the promulgation of martial law ceased to exist the courts must declare the continuance of martial law as without lawful authority. If on the other hand, the court found that the martial law administrator was himself trying to perpetuate his own tenure the court must declare that the martial law was invalid 'ab initio' in accordance with the principle attested by Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke in the case of six carpenters of 1610 (1558 to 1774, All England Reporters, P.292).

The counsel argued that since on the basis of his reasoning the mandate for the present martial law must be derived from the case of Begum Musrat Bhutto (PLD 1977, Supreme Court, P.657) the Court must, at all times, refer back to that judgment to see the scope of the powers vested in the CMLA.

According to that judgment, the CMLA had no power at all to deprive the high courts of their constitutional power of judicial review (PP 722-723). Any attempt by the CMLA (including the Provisional

Constitution Order) was 'non set' and must be ignored.

Continuing his argument, the counsel submitted that even the power to amend the constitution could not be employed to abrogate or change the Constitution in material particulars as held by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Darvesh Arby's case reported (NLR 1978 (civil) Lahore, P.394). The PCO in effect amounts to the abrogation of the Constitution of 1973 as:

(a) it made martial law superior to the Constitution and the constitutional institutions such as the courts;

(b) despite its name it was for an indefinite duration; and

(c) it was in aid of the perpetuation of the present Government.

"The Provisional Constitution Order must, therefore, be ignored and the matter decided as if there were no restrictions on the power of the court", the counsel argued.

He concluded by saying that the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the Advocate-General was delivered by two judges of that court in which the judgment in Begum Nusrat Bhutto's case was not considered.

The latter judgement was delivered by seven judges of that court. And must, therefore, be followed in accordance with the principles laid down in Faqir Muhammad's case (PLD 1973, Supreme Court, P.110), he added.

CSO: 4600/709

STEEL MILLS: EXPANSION PLANS DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text] KARACHI, Aug 9: Lt-Gen Saeed Qadir, Minister for Production said here today that the cold rolling mill, last unit of the under-construction Pakistan Steel complex will go into operation by the end of August or early September, marking the completion of the Rs 2,500-crore project.

The Production Minister said that a new 200-m.w electricity unit was being set up at the steel mills.

The under-construction cold rolling mills would alone require 150/200 m.w of electricity, he said.

Inaugurating the executive management seminar on "energy conservation" organised by State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation and, ENAR Petrotech Services at a local Hotel. The minister said, industrial Energy Management can provide major benefits to the country as a whole and its industries like steel, cement, and fertiliser in 80 per cent of the total industrial energy consumption.

Cut in consumptions

The Production Minister said that energy was a fundamental element of industrialisation, unfortu-

nately this sector was ignored in the past plannings. When he took over the portfolio of Production Ministry he initiated discussions on the need for energy conservation in industries. In the beginning he had advocated only a five per cent cut in energy consumption by avoiding wastages.

Lt. Gen. Qadir said that all cement plants in the country had been converted to use furnace oil instead of the precious natural gas.

Search for oil, gas

Quoting the examples of the energy conservation in some developed nations, he said that Japan was consuming 220 million kilo-litres of fuel in 1971 and 285 million kilo-litres in 1973, but now it had succeeded in cutting down energy consumption to only 210 million kilo-litres through various conservation methods. Similar efforts were being made in South Korea and the United States of America to conserve energy and avoid wastages.

He said that the United States had succeeded in its energy conservation efforts to the extent of 32 per cent. In Japan, all petrol pumps used to remain closed on Sundays and Holidays during the last energy crisis.

Lt. Gen. Saeed Qadir said that while continuing efforts for energy conservation, the Government had actively promoted the search for oil and gas in the country. A number of new oil wells had been discovered in the past few months. The recent discovery of natural gas near Multan would contribute to the improvement of situation.

The Minister asked the organisers of the seminar to send their recommendations to the Government and the private sector for necessary follow-up action.

He said that the message of energy conservation should also be taken to schools and colleges so that an awareness of its need might be created among the youth.

Earlier, Mr. Jawaid Ahmad Mirza, Chairman State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Ltd., in his welcome address explained the aims and objects of the seminar. He said that the seminar has been organised in order to highlight the importance of energy management and to create conservation awareness among executive management in Pakistan.

Dr. A.A. Faruqui, Managing Director ANAR and Dr. Shahid K. Haq, head of the energy management systems, also spoke on the occasion.

CSO: 4600/709

WOMEN RESOLVE TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL RIGHTS

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 84 p 2

[Text] LAHORE, Aug 9--A coordinating committee, representing 11 women's organisations, unanimously rejected on Thursday the law of Qisas and Diyat, as adopted by Majlis-i-Shoora, and resolved to continue its struggle till women were guaranteed equal rights.

The committee, in a resolution passed at a protest meeting at the Lahore High Court Bar, described the Qisas-Diyat law as un-Islamic, inhuman and reactionary "aimed at usurping the rights of women as well as driving society, as a whole, backwards".

It urged the Government to refrain from legislating on matters having a direct bearing on basic human rights and leave all substantive matters for a representative government to decide.

The resolution called upon progressive and enlightened classes and the people in general to wage a relentless struggle against a handful of reactionary elements out to reduce the status of women and lower social values generally.

The committee also criticised the approval of the Law of Evidence by the Federal Cabinet on Wednesday. It said that even if the law had been approved by the Council of Islamic Ideology and recommended by Majlis-i-Shoora, women would resist its enforcement. Another resolution demanded that the Council of Islamic Ideology be dissolved and a new one set up in its place.

The meeting was addressed by six speakers representing different women's organisations, while two of them read poems. Begum Mehnaz Rafi said that the Laws of Evidence and Qisas and Diyat, together with other measures, were aimed at reducing status of women politically.

Miss Hina Jilani, speaking on the legal aspects of the law of Qisas and Diyat, said that women were op-

posed to the entire law, particularly to Section 10-A, which denied women and non-Muslims the right to give evidence in cases of pre-meditated murder, and Section 28 which fixed the Diyat for female victim of murder to half that for a male victim. This was not only unjust but also humiliating.

She said Islam gave equal rights to human beings, irrespective of sex and race.

Miss Huma Safdar opposed the legislation. Matters having a direct bearing on basic human rights must be dealt with by a representative government, she said. According to her, the real purpose of bringing in such controversial laws was to divert the people's attention from real problems facing them.

Ms Khawar Mumtaz described the law as "discriminatory" and said the right to depose before a

court of law was the basic right of all citizens. Miss F.A. Tabassum, a Christian lawyer, saw the law as discriminatory against the non-Muslim minorities.

The organisations represented on the committee are: the All-Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), The Punjab Women Lawyers Association, the National Women Lawyers Organisation, the Women's Action Forum (both National and Democratic), Anjuman Behbood-i-Khawateen, Anjuman Jamhooriat Pasand Khawateen, Tehrik-i-Khawateen, Tehrik-i-Niswan, the Business and Professional Women's Club, and the Soroptimist Club.

CSO: 4600/709

LETTER WRITERS SAY LAW, ORDER SITUATION IN SIND VERY SERIOUS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 26 Jul 84 p 3

[Letter to the Editor]

[Text]

THE LETTERS by Mr. Lalchand Dahir and Sohail Ghakhr (June 21) touch the crux of the problem of dacoity in Sind. Those who think that the "law and order situation is not so serious" may be in for a nasty surprise in the coming months. So far, their actions have been sporadic and disorganized, but reports reaching our village suggest that a mighty explosion is in the offing. The major targets, according to reports, will not be civilians but communication links. With modern weapons available, courtesy of the Afghans, microwave towers, railway tracks, bridges, road transport owned by the Government will fall prey to the dacoits. City dwellers, particularly those in Karachi and Hyderabad, should beware of the cutting off of food supplies to these centres.

Paroo Chandio was a petty thief when he was first put behind the bars. The treatment meted out to him while he was in prison turned him into a vicious criminal. Yet, in his violent death he was transformed into a folk hero. Have the intelligence services carried out any investigations as to the reasons for a convict turning into a saviour in the eyes of the people?

The appointment in Sind of a large number of senior police officers, whose mother tongue is not Sindhi, has been the cause of discontent among the people of this region. The Servants of Sind Society, a recently formed organisation, has un-

equivocally voiced its concern about this problem. They may have overlooked the virtual absence of Sindhis in the armed forces. In order to fully assess the situation, the military selection boards should provide statistics about the total number of applicants over the years, particularly from the rural areas of Sind, and the numbers finally selected.

According to a recent newspaper report, three Superintendents of Police from NWFP (Chitral, Bannu and D.I. Khan) have been placed at the disposal of the Sind Government. In the good old British days, the Governors recruited natives from one region of India to go and sort out recalcitrant elements in another region. While we may be working over-time to get rid of the language of our previous masters, we want to cling to their crafty techniques of dealing with the natives.

A return to a representative form of Government, and lets use the hated word, democracy, may help us avoid the violence that would otherwise take place. A democratic government would respect the rights of the smaller provinces by instituting a federation of provinces. Only through such a course can we move towards a peaceful solution of our problems. — NADIR JAKHRANI, SAIN DINO SWALFHI, ALI GOHAR, ARSHAD LAHORI, AACHER GHALLU and ZAHID HUSAIN, Kandiaro.

CSO: 4600/711

BRIEFS

PALEEJO: MEDICAL TREATMENT URGED--LAHORE, Aug 9--Syed Afzal Haider, a member of the Pakistan Bar Council, has in telegrams to the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Gen. Ziaul Haq and the Sind Governor, Lt. Gen. Jahandad Khan, appealed that Mr. Rasool Bux Paleejo, in prison for three years, be released and provided the best possible medical treatment at home or abroad, at government expense. Syed Afzal Haider said in his telegram that Mr. Paleejo had been in prison without trial, first in the Punjab and then in Sind where his health had deteriorated and if he was not treated immediately, he might go blind. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 84 p 2]

EDIBLE OILS CORPORATION DELAYED--LAHORE, Aug 9--The establishment of the proposed edible oils corporation may further be delayed because the funds required for setting up the new organisation have not been approved yet. The decision to set up the corporation was taken by the Federal Government in January last and it was expected to start functioning by June. Informed sources told Dawn on Thursday that it might take another few months before the corporation could be established. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 84 p 2]

CHANGE IN EDUCATION POLICY--The Government is considering classifying students at secondary level in two groups, and only intelligent students would be able to get admission for university education, while others would be given technical and professional education. This was stated by the Education Minister, Dr. Mohammad Afzal, while addressing cadets at He said that the atmosphere of the universities would become peaceful and education standard would be improved when only intelligent students were selected for higher education in universities. No student would be appointed as teacher or lecturer for the next three years in the same college or university wherefrom he got his degree or certificate, the Minister added. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 11 Aug 84 p 1]

NWFP OFFICES ON 6-DAY WEEK--PESHAWAR, Aug 10--A number of Federal Government offices here have reverted to six-day week and old office hours--from 7.30 a.m. to 2 p.m. These include the offices of Accountant-General and Assistant Director, Immigration and Passport. These offices have reportedly told their headquarters in Islamabad that the change has been necessitated by reversion of NWFP Government offices to six-day week. The provincial Secretariat and some Federal Government offices, however, continue to observe five-day week. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 11 Aug 84 p 10]

AMNESTY PLEA FOR RAZA KASIM--LAHORE, Aug. 2--Amnesty International has appealed to General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, President of Pakistan, to personally look into the case of Raza Kazim, who should be formally charged in an ordinary court of law and be permitted regular access to his family and legal counsel. Amnesty International, has circulated an appeal, carrying details of the case, and expressed concern over reports of Raza Kazim's ill health and urged that he should be made available all necessary medical treatment. It also asked the Government of Pakistan that all relevant information regarding charges framed against the accused be provided to the Defence Counsel, otherwise he should be released immediately. Expressing concern over his health, the appeal said that Raza Kazim is in his mid-fifties and was reported to be suffering from a chronic bronchial and other ailments which need regular treatment. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Aug 84 p 6]

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